Rage and Fury of the "Battle of the Bulge"

The term "Battle of the Bulge" was not new in December 1944.  The phrase was used in May 1940 to describe the opening phase of the German breakout through in to France.  This article was published in The war Illustrated on 31 May 1940 and describes the opening of the Battle of France, with only a slight indication that it wasn't going to end in the favour of France.

Opening on May 14, what came to be described as the "Battle of the Bulge" soon developed into a conflict of earth shaking importance.  Here we tell of its initial phase, up to the end of the first week's fighting.

"The fate of our country and that of our Allies, the destinies of the world, depend on the battle now in progress."  So began an Order of the Day issued by General Gamelin on Friday, 17 May.  "Any soldier who cannot advance" continued the Allied Generalissimo, "should allow himself to be killed rather than abandon that part of our national soil which has been entrusted to him.  As always in grave hours of our history, the order today is 'Conquer or die.' We must conquer."  Grave words, but not too grave for the crisis which in the course of a few short days had developed in the Western battle zone.

At the beginning of the week the German thrust seemed to be centred in Belgium, whose army, in touch with the Dutch remnant to the north, strongly supported by the British Expeditionary Force in the centre and closely linked with the French on the right, was slowly retreating on the line Antwerp-Brussels-Namur.  Suddenly on Tuesday, May 14, a new and far greater battle developed to the south in the Ardennes.  "On the Meuse south of Namur," ran the French war communique issued at 10.30 on the night of that fateful day, "the Germans have attempted to cross the river at several points.  We have launched counter-attacks and the fighting continues, more especially in the region of Sedan, where the enemy is making a momentous effort with furious obstinacy and at the expense of heavy casualties."

Onslaught on an Unprecedented Scale

Soon it was apparent that the French line from Montmedy, where the deep underground works of the Maginot Line terminate, to Maubeuge was cracking; indeed at several points the line was actually pierced and through the gap poured German armoured columns consisting of vast numbers of tanks, their way blasted open by a veritable armada of warplanes.  For an onslaught on such unprecedented scale the French defenders were unprepared; their ranks, apparently, had been depleted by the dispatch of their reserves to aid the threatened front in Belgium to the norht.  Despite the most desperate efforts to hold up the attack and to establish a fresh front, the German onrush continued with unabated fury.  In a comparatively few hours General Corap's Ninth Army had met disaster, a 90 mile front had been overrun, and like a three pronged fork the Germans plunged towards the very heart of France.

A French War Office spokesman described the onslaught as "a great hurricane."  The French infantry, he declared, had resisted admirably, but, faced at certain points by overwhelming mass of tank units, they have been obliged to give way.  Once through the gap, the tanks spread out fanwise in all directions until the battle took on what one of the French war communiques described s "the aspect of a terrible melee."  Here and there there was fierce hand to hand fighting, and for the first time in history there were battles on a grand scale between the tanks of the rival armies.

By now, however, it was too late to effect real consolidation, and for several days more the French were compelled to fall back, abandoning town after town to the hated enemy.  The real war had come at last to the Western Front - the real war, not of fixed positions, but of a struggle in the open.

There was no line; nothing, indeed, in the nature of an established front.  Over the French countryside roamed at large 2,500, or it may be 3,000, German tanks - estimated to constitute at least half of the enemy's tank divisions - in individual units, in small detachments, or in great masses.  Furthermore, as the battle developed, tens of thousands of Nazi motor-cyclists, armed to the teeth, were dispatched to harry and ravage far in front of the main fight.

By the end of the week a great bulge had been formed in the Allied line between Maubeuge and Sedan, reaching out into north-east France as far as Rethel on the Aisne.  And the bulge was getting bigger day by day, almost hour by hour.  Drastic measures were called for if disaster were to be averted.  Mr Churchill went to Paris, where in conference with the French chiefs means were devised for the common defense.  The French armies were regrouped; and Britain's magnificent air force, which had already established its mastery over the Nazis, was flung into the fight against the ravaging tanks.  In the north the Allied line was falling back in order to conform with the new situation, and Germany was jubilant over the capture of Brussels and Antwerp.

But though the situation was grave, as M. Reynaud admitted in his broadcast to the nation on the evening of Saturday, May 18, it was by no means desperate.  "It is in such circumstances as these," he declared, "that the French people show what is in them."  He announced that he had called to his side Marshall Petain, the victor of Verdun; and on the following evening the world was electrified by the news that another of the triumphant figures of the Great War, General Weygand, had been appointed to the Supreme Command in place of General Gamelin.  His appointment was widely hailed as an augury of victory, for Weygand was Foch's closest collaborator in 1918 when the German hordes thundering on the way to Paris were halted, and at length chased across the frontier.

But at that moment it needed faith and vision to talk or think of victory.  When M. Reynaud faced the Senate on May 21 his first words were "the country is in danger," and he went on to tell how by a series of "incredible mistakes" the bridges over the Meuse had not been destroyed, and when across these bridges there passed the German "Panzer" (iron-clad) divisions they encountered nothing but French units who were "scattered ill-cadred, and badly trained."  With the total disorganisation of General Corap's Ninth Army the hinge of the French army had been broken.  The Premier went on to tell how a huge breach had been opened in the front, and that already the Germans had penetrated as far as Arras and Amiens.  "The truth is," he went on, "that our classic conception of the conduct of war has come up against a new conception" - one which combines the massive use of heavy armoured divisions in cooperation with aeroplanes and the creation of disorder in the rear by means of parachute raids.

As that black day dragged on there came news of still more disasters.  General Giraud, newly appointed commander of the French Ninth Army, was said to be taken prisoner by the Germans with the whole of his staff, and to the towns which had been reached by their advanced mechanised    forces was added Abbeville, only 15 miles from the English Channel.  Arras, where only a few days before had been Lord Gort's headquarters, was the scene of fierce street fighting, and Amiens was largely in flames.  (Arras, indeed was stated on 22nd to have been recaptured, and so fluid was the situation that important fighting developed in the Cambrai-Vallencennes area, 25 miles behind Arras itself.)  In a huge area of Northern France not a building of any description remained undamaged, as the invader systematically destroyed all that came within his path.  The Channel ports on which the British Army was now withdrawing - in unbroken order and in good heart - were being heavily bombed.

It was worse than 1914, worse even than 1918.  It was the hour of supreme crisis, the hour in which the tick of every second would have its echo through untold centuries.

157th HAA Battery Diary entries 21 to 25 May 1940

Five days of diary entry for 157th HAA Battery as it regroups in Nantes.

21/5/40

0400 Preparation for evacuation of Battery to NANTES No.2 Base Sub Area. Orders issued that Battery would move at 1200 hours.

1145 Battery column assembled. Took cover while a few bombs were dropped on area.

1200 Column moved off. Destination railway station ROUILLY-GEROUDOT road

1345 Battery column complete arrived at destination. Many evacuees on roads. Loading of guns commenced immediately. This was a very difficult task as guns had to be side loaded on to trucks about 10 inches above siding platform. All guns were manhandled on to trucks one or two breaking through truck floors and having to be hauled up and moved. Tasks completed and train ready to move approx. 2200 hours.

1900 Road party moved off at approx. 1900 hours.

22/5/40

0500 Journey in progress. One gun broke through truck floor during journey had to be man handled to fresh position on truck.

NANTES

23/5/40

0300 Trained arrived NANTES. Off loading commenced immediately. All guns and instruments delivered to Ordnance repair and overhaul. Personnel placed under canvas at CHATEUX LOMBARDIRIE, NANTES.

24/5/40

0800 "Stocktaking" of stores, personnel etc. Reconnaisance of three gun positions south of river LOIRE carried out by Battery Commander. Redistribution of personnel with three sections (ie 2 - Two guns and 1 - Three guns). Fitters and working parties sent to Ordnance to assist with guns and instruments.

25/5/40

0800 Map ENVIRONS DE NANTES (PROJECTION LAMBERT - II - ZONE CENTRALE)

Locations 157 Bty HQ CHAU BALINIERE
P I LA METAIRIE
P 2 JAGUIERE
P 3 LA RONJONIERE
One section (Lt. Ross) deployed to P 3. Personnel under canvas

1600 One gun in action P 3. Enemy air activity NIL (in area)

157th Battery Diary entries 21 and 22 May 1940

Diary entries for 21 and 22 May 1940 recording the journey to Nantes.

21/5/40

0400 Preparation for evacuation of Battery to NANTES No.2 Base Sub Area. Orders issued that Battery would move at 1200 hours.

1145 Battery column assembled. Took cover while a few bombs were dropped on area.

1200 Column moved off. Destination railway station ROUILLY-GEROUDOT road

1345 Battery column complete arrived at destination. Many evacuees on roads. Loading of guns commenced immediately. This was a very difficult task as guns had to be side loaded on to trucks about 10 inches above siding platform. All guns were manhandled on to trucks one or two breaking through truck floors and having to be hauled up and moved. Tasks completed and train ready to move approx. 2200 hours.

1900 Road party moved off at approx. 1900 hours.

22/5/40

0500 Journey in progress. One gun broke through truck floor during journey had to be man handled to fresh position on truck.

The Evacuation of the 157th Battery 16 to 20 1940

Just after midnight on the seventh day of the Battle of France a top secret urgent order was issued consisting of one word, "SCRAM". It was recieved in the Battery HQ of 157th Battery by Rogers, who was on duty that night. The message he noted down was the command for the 157th HAA Battery to evacuate the AASF airfields that they had been defending in the area around Reims for the past 6 months. The chaotic scenes that followed were not in line with agreed evacuation orders and resulted in the 53rd HAA Regiment being split up a few days later.

The breakout of the German army from Sedan on 14 May 1940 led to secret plans being issued for the move of the AASF from the area around Reims, where both the RAF and members of the British Territorial Army had been stationed since late September 1939. The plan was to evacuate the AASF south to the area around Troyes. By 15 May 1940 the Germans were reported to be in the Reims area and preparation for the evacuation of the anti aircraft regiments defending the AASF airfields was commenced. All the guns were in action all day gun walls were removed and stores were packed in readiness.

The orders, which were marked "Secret", were issued by 12th Anti Aircraft Brigade on 14 May to 53rd Regiment. They gave detail instructions of how the evacuation would be notified and location of the new airfields the AASF would be operating from. The word "SCRAM" would be issued to from the Brigade Headquarters to start the first part of the move followed by "SCRAM TWO" to initiate the second part of the move. All units were instructed to be ready to move at two hours notice. The plan envisaged a controlled withdrawal of the units down the main road leading from Reims via Louvais, Marevil, Vertus, and terminating at Fere Chamemoise. It further stipulated that all units would move with two days of fresh rations and three days of reserve rations. The Batteries of the 157th, that is PIP I, II and III, were assigned to defend AASF airfields at Anglure, St Lucien Ferme and Echemines.

At 00:40 hours on 16 May, the 53rd Regimental HQ issued the following urgent order to the 157th Battery HQ (codename PIP) in Vezernay.

"SCRAM VERY URGENT Stage III Para. 5 and note."

The intention was to put the first part of the evacuation into effect. However, at 04:30 hours the Officer Commanding 157th HAA Battery issued another order to PIP I. It read:

"Scram immediately - take only predictor - height indicator -Breeches - spotter telescope - personnel. You have one 3 tonner and two 30 cwt. Very urgent. Just rendezvous BERGERE T 28 38 * Ends"

The urgency of the situation is well captured in this brief message which was sent by Major Jim Chivers RA. The hand written record original of the message is on the files at the National Archive in Kew and was written by Rogers, with whom Frank shared his billet whilst in Vezernay. Frank mentions Rogers on several occasions in his letters.

The order of the move in one stage, and not the planned two stages, resulted in the 53rd HAA Regiment leaving behind 16 of their 24 3 inch anti aircraft guns. Stores were also abandoned and the petrol dump was fired.

On the afternoon of 16 May 1940 Lt Col Krohn, the officer commanding of the 53rd HAA Regiment sent a message by Despatch Rider to Major Chivers which read:

'Many valuable stores left at PIP II also canteen stock etc * Send one lorry under responsible NCO with small party of men to collect as much as possible * These HQs now situate VIZZACERF 10.5 kilo's south east of MERY * Report progress your move per this * DR [Despatch Rider]" (File reference National Archive WO167/637)

The failure to implement the evacuation orders in two stages as planned resulted in the firing of the fuel dump which caused the next day when trying to evacuate the 157th Battery to the Troyes area. Whilst the Battery regrouped at Droupt St Marie on 17 and 18 May, the 12th (AA) Brigade was putting plans in place to move the Battery again.

The decision was taken to split the 53rd HAA Regiment and attach the 158th Battery to the 73rd HAA Regiment. This Regiment was tasked with the anti aircraft defence of Nantes. This decision, in time, put the men of the battery on the SS Lancastria which was sunk with great loss of life as it left Nantes later in June 1940. The 12th (AA) Brigade believed that the "SCRAM" evacuation on 15 May had been made more difficult by the "over-reaction of certain units" which resulted in stores and guns having to be salvaged from the airfields around Reims. During one of these salvage operations 2 officers (including the Regimental Chaplain) and 5 other ranks were captured by the Germans. A later review of campaign in France by the 12th (AA) Brigade was damning and concluded that "they [53rd] had exceeded the evacuation order." As a result of the botched evacuation 14 of the 18 guns of the 53rd were left temporarily out of action and had to be sent to Nantes for refitting.

The 53rd (less the 158th Battery) was ordered to move to Rouilly-Geraudot Station on the Troyes to Piney railway line to load and entrain at 17:00 hours on 21 May. The Regiment was ordered to move as much equipment as possible to a concealed position close to the station on 20 May. By this stage the 53rd only had 14 guns remaining and they were further ordered to hand over all their anti tank rifles and ammunition to the 73rd HAA Regiment. The 158th Battery took 176 rounds per gun for their four 3 inch guns and the 53rd was ordered to dump the remaining anti aircraft shells; the 12th (AA) Brigade HQ was to be told the location of the dump, although it was probably never recovered with the rapid advance of the Germans.

Not all of the 53rd Regiment travelled by train on 21 May and a group travelled by road to Nantes in the Regiments remaining motor transport.. The route took them via Sens, Montargis, Orleans, Tours and then to Nantes. Sufficient petrol for 300 miles was carried in the convoy.

Sadly, the 53rd HAA Regiment did not come out of this period well. The panic and chaos caused by the rapid German advance, the rumours of paratroopers, spies and fifth columnists will all have added to the over reaction to the evacuation order early in the morning of 15 May 1940. The Regimental diary recorded on 13 May that "Parachute troops dressed as workmen are reported to have been dropped." Such reports, true or not, led to chaos behind the lines.

The botched evacuation in the early morning of 15 May had a significant impact on the involvement of the Regiment in the rest of the French campaign. Some personnel of the 158th Battery were drowned when the SS Lancastria was sunk and the other two batteries ended up becoming the last Bristish regiment to be formally evacuated from France when they left Marseille on 18 June 1940.

157th HAA Battery Diary entries 19 and 20 May 1940

German Panzers made it to Amiens on the afternoon of 19 May 1940 cutting the AASF off from the BEF.  The territorial soldiers of the 157th HAA Battery 53rd HAA (City of London) Regiment were now cut off from the channel coast and the BEF and received orders to head for Nantes.

The diary entries for 19 and 20 May 1940 read as follows:

19/05/40

08:00 Orders received that no further salvage forces will be sent out.  Two guns in action ST LUCIEN FERME.  One in action POUAN (EAST).  One in action POUAN (WEST).  Preliminary instructions received re. reorganisation of 12th (Anti Aircraft) Brigade.

20/05/40

08:00 Detailed instructions received re. reorganisation of 12th (Anti Aircraft) Brigade received and put into action.  Transfer of personnel carried out and equipment handed over.
Instructions re. move of remainder of Battery to Nantes received.

Parachute Troops Bring War from the Skies

This article was published in The War Illustrated on 24 May 1940.

In the opening days of "total war" on the Western Front the Nazis made great use of their parachute troops.  Some account of these well armed desperadoes, who created much confusion and havoc behind the lines in Holland, is given here.

From just before dawn on May 10 the sky above the Low Countries was often filled with black blobs dangling from silvery parachutes dropping slowly into woods and fields far behind the zone of the fiercest fighting.

News of their approach kept the Dutch radio fully occupied.  "Waves of German parachutists are coming over," said Hilversum; "keep a sharp look out for them"; and from Brussels there came similar warnings.  Dropped from flights of three to five machines, the parachutists descended close to the principal strategic centres and the most vital aerodromes - to mention but a few, near Delft, only 13 miles from The Hague; at Waalhaven, Rotterdam's principal airport, where they joined hands with German troops who had been landed from transports and flying boats;  Dordrecht; Gouda, near Amsterdam; and Hooge Zwaluwe, where what only a short time before would have been regarded as fantastic project - the seizure of the Dutch sovereign and the Netherlands Government.

Armed with machine guns or mortars and pistols, and equipped with steel helmets, gas masks, binoculars, portable wireless sets, explosives, tents, and folding bicycles - these airborne arsenals silently dropped to earth, and if their advent had been undetected, crept away through the grass or trees on their nefarious missions.  Some kept a sharp lookout for Dutch military movements and at once used their wireless sets to transmit the information they had gathered to their headquarters behind the German lines, or conveyed it to the dwelling of a traitorous Dutch Nazi or German spy.  Some set about the blowing up of bridges and railways and the destruction of telegraph lines, while other with machine guns strove to prevent the demolition by the Dutch of their dykes and bridgeheads.

Such work calls for military qualities of a high order, and these Nazi storm troops of 1940 pattern were picked men, resolute to do or die in their allotted tasks.  It is true that the Dutch reported the discovery of the corpses of several parachutists who had obviously been shot in the back - presumably by their officers in the 'plane when they had displayed an undue reluctance to take the drop into space. These must have been exceptions, however, judging from the amount of damage which the parachutists were able to effect.  Quite apart from this material havoc there was what may be described as their "nuisance value" and their influence on the morale of a people even so phlegmatically resolute as the Dutch.

In many cases, it was alleged, the parachutists were disguised in Dutch uniforms or in the uniforms of the British or French troops.  Moreover, there were well authenticated reports of them having landed dressed as clergymen, peasants , and even as women and girls.  So disguised, their passage through the countryside may well have been facilitated, so that they were enabled to approach their objectives without arousing suspicion.

Such a breach of military usage was indignantly denounced by the Dutch Government, and some at least f the disguised soldiers were shot out of hand as spies.  The German official news agency replied by threatening "immediate and most violent reprisals" for any such "ill treatment" of their parachutists.  The parachute pilots it asserted were part of the German regular army, and "their special uniform is not camouflaged and cannot be mistaken either for the uniform of foreign armies or civilian clothes."  For every parachutist so "ill treated" they would shoot ten prisoners.  "The young German army is proud of its parachute pilots."

Not only in Holland did the parachutists present a constant threat, but in Belgium and even in little Luxemburg - which, indeed, was captured in the course of a few hours by parachute troops.  While the Dutch and Belgian soldiers, aided y their French and British allies, were valiantly resisting the Nazi hordes in the battle zone along the Eastern frontier, for scores of miles behind them in the very heart of the countries they were defending, the parachute troops of the enemy were doing their utmost to stab the defenders in the back.

157th HAA Battery Diary entry 18 May 1940

The Diary entry for 18 May 1940 gives the new positions for the Battery as it is pushed west by the German advance.  The salvage from the old gunsites continues, allowing the guns to operate again.

18/5/40

0800 Further salvage parties sent to old gunsites for guns and stores. New positions at ST LUCIEN FERME and PUAN reconnoitered by Battery Commander.

1140 Two guns on site at ST LUCIEN FERME.

1330 One gun on site at POUAN (EAST).

1715 Two guns in action ST LUCIEN FERME. Two guns on site POUAN (WEST). All guns recovered together with practically all stores and ammunition.