AASF Airfield Winter 1939/40

A seasonal scene of sentries guarding a Fairey Battle on one of the airfields of the Advanced Air Striking Force of the RAF in North East France in December 1939.  Note the canvas covering to keep the engine warm in the harsh winter of 1939/40.

From Gibraltar to Liverpool via the City of Cairo - June 1940

Frank and the rest of Regiment, consisting of 157th and 159th HAA Batteries returned to England from Gibraltar on 12 July 1940.  Frank sailed on the Ellerman's Hall Line ship the S.S. City of Cairo. Frank sent a post card home to his Dad which is posted marked Liverpool, 12.15am 13 July 1940. The franking mark says "HELP TO WIN ON THE KITCHEN FRONT".

The SS City of Cairo was sunk later in the war on 6 November 1942 by the the German U Boat, U-68 1000 miles west of southern Africa in the South Atlantic.  Six life boats, led by Captain Rogerson (Rogerson joined the ship in Southampton on 22 July 1940), made their way across the open ocean to St Helena and were rescued on 19 November 1942 creating one of the epic survival stories of World War 2.

The ship was built in 1915 in Hull by Earles Shipbuilding and Engineering Co Ltd and was part of the Merchant navy in the First World War.  The wreck of the SS City of Cairo was located in 2013 and in 2015 the huge cargo of silver Rupees were salvaged from the wreck.  A memorial marker was placed on the wreck by the salvage company 100 years after the launch of the SS City of Cairo.

Frank wrote and posted one card and kept a second card as a souvenir of his voyage from Gibraltar to England in July 1940

Postmark - Liverpool 12.15am 13 July 1940

Frank's message on the post card.

Ellerman's Hall Line SS City of Cairo

The Well Traveled Envelope - June to August 1940

This is the only envelope and letter that I have from the whole set of 1939 to 1940 letters .  It is also unusual as it is a letter from Frank's father, my Great Grandfather, William Faulkner.  Although his letters are always referred to in Frank's, this is the only one that survived.

This envelope is special as it clearly records the journey of the letter as it made its way around the postal system in search of Frank; remarkably, despite the Fall of France and the Battle of Britain, the Army Post Office eventually got the letter to Frank 2 months after it was posted.

The letter can be found under the 24 June 1940 link on the left of the blog page.

The front of the envelope with the stamps covered and originally addressed to Frank in Gibralter.  It was posted on 24 June 1940.

The back of the envelope.  Getting close - "try 157, not 159".

A Post Office franking stamp showing the letter passed through South Kensington London SW1, on the back of the envelope. 

Anti Aircraft Division HQ stamp showing the date the letter reached finally reached Frank.

The stamps were covered with a label but were a 1 penny and half penny stamp from the commemorative issue marking the centenary of the Penny Black.

"Please forward LAA DIV. AA", although Frank was with an HAA Regiment (the difference being Light and Heavy). 

The date on the letter, 24 June 1940, with the final date stamp on the envelope, 17 August 1940.

RAF Haddock Force June 1940 Part 5 (the final part)

This the final part of my article on RAF Haddock Force.  I hope that you have enjoyed finding out about this little known episode of the Battle of France and thank you for taking the time to read it.

Chapter 3

The twelve Wellingtons which arrived at Salon during the afternoon of 11th June were from Nos. 37 and 75 Squadrons; each Squadron provided six aircraft. They had left their base at Feltwell in Norfolk at 0915 hrs. and were under the command of Wing Commander Merton. The maintenance personnel were taken to Honnington, Norfolk, from where they were flown to Salon.[1]

The Wellingtons were bombed-up and refuelled in readiness for the opening blow in the war against Italy. As the RAF ground personnel went about their duties Wing Commander Field received a visitor who was to start what eventually turned into a night of chaos caused by conflicting orders.

The visitor, a Captain from the staff of General Gama, who commanded the 11e Groupment de Bombardment, told Field that the planned operations were not to be carried by either French or English aircraft. But at 1925 hrs. a cypher was received at Salon which contained the orders for the attack to go ahead. Field wrote the next day that,

"Subsequently, I personnally received a large number of telephone messages from various French authorities, as a result of which I telephoned to Headquarters, BAFF, and in due course received two messages, including one from yourself (Air Marshall Barratt), that no cancellation of these orders was intended."[2]

At 2145 hrs. Air Marshall Barratt received an urgent request from General Vuillemin to stop the attack on Italy. Barratt immediately rang the Air Ministry but he was informed that Churchill and General Ismay were in France at General Weygand's headquarters near Orléans. In his memoirs Churchill recalls that dinner was just being served when Ismay was called to the telephone to speak to Barratt. Churchill, Eden, Dill, Weygand and Reynaud left the table to discuss the situation and Reynaud agreed that the attack should go ahead, and the French authorities were not to interfere any further. One factor in favour of allowing the Wellingtons to proceed was that the Whitleys, also attacking Northern Italy the same night, were too far out to be recalled. The planned combined attack would increase the force of the first aerial attack on Italy.

In the meantime Field had been receiving calls from all quarters of the French Government and Armed Forces. One message came from the Headquarters of the 3rd French Army stating, "the cancellation of the contemplated operation for this evening, as transmitted by the Chief of Staff of General Houdemon, was confirmed". Then a member of the staff of the Vice-Admiral Prefet Maratime of Toulon telephoned. The Captain informed Field that the French Government had formerly forbidden an attack to take place.

The messages continued and Field was even requested to telephone General Vuillemin to hear directly that the operation had been cancelled. At 2300 hrs. Barratt spoke to Ismay again who confirmed that with the Whitleys on the way, Britain was committed to the continuation of the operation. Field had been replying to the French calls and orders that he could only accept orders from superior officers under whom he was placed and who had ordered him to proceed. A further confirmation came, when Barratt telephoned Field and ordered that the operation was to proceed.

It was by this time, after midnight, and the Wellingtons had been ready to depart for almost five hours. If they had to wait any longer the operation would have had to have been cancelled because of the danger of the Wellingtons returning after dawn.

At about 0027 Field received a telephone call from Salon informing him that the Wellingtons were unable to take-off. This was because as the aircraft taxied into position to take-off a number of French military lorries were driven onto the runway and parked so as to prevent the operation taking place. The French drivers were under the orders of Commandant Treff, the commanding officer of the remaining French forces on the other side of the airfield at Salon. Field immediately cancelled the operation for the night as he felt that such action could only be countered by force which would have been unjustifiable. In a brief message to No.3 Group sent at 0200 hrs. the cancellation was reported and concluded, "Reasons to follow in letter."[3]

In the letter which Field sent to Barratt the next day describing the events of the previous night4 he concludes with a report that he clearly did not believe. Field received further messages after the cancellation of the operation from General Houdemon, on the authority of General Vuillemin, that the operation had been cancelled by Churchill. This attempt by the French to make an excuse for the fiasco at Salon was absurd, as Churchill had been one of the major supporters of hitting Italy hard the moment she entered the war.

The incident at Salon clearly reflected the feelings of the two Allies towards the continued prosecution of the war. The French, who were already at this stage considering an Armistice, did not want to provoke the Italians into attacking Southern France. The morale of the French High Command was so low that they could not see any advantage in even attempting to strike at Italy. The twelve aircraft of 'Haddock' could hardly have brought devastation to Northern Italy, but would have demonstrated to the Italian leadership the reality of declaring war.

Mussolini had not dared to order an immediate land attack on France and it was not until 17th June that an attack was ordered. A general attack was launched on 20th June and by this time the ground forces of 'Haddock' were at sea nearing Gibralter.

The incident did cause a strain to relations between the French and the British but not as great as that caused by the sinking of the French Fleet at Oran in July 1940. Both these events although very different demonstrate how far apart the French and the British were in there attitude towards the continuance of the war. At this desperate stage in the Battle of France the British were still determined to strike at a threat to France, without French support.

Notes

1          AIR 27 385 June 1940

2          AIR 35 323 9A

3          AIR 35 157 36A

4          AIR 35 323 9A Copies were also sent to AOC in C Bomber Command and AOC No.3 Group.

RAF Haddock Force June 1940 Part 4

Chapter 2 - RAF Haddock Force

One of the negative points about the airfields in the Marseilles area was that it was felt that they vulnerable to aerial attack from the direction of the sea. 'Haddock' therefore had to be given adequate anti-aircraft protection or the bombers from England might become easy targets.

The problem was that with the worsening situation in Northern France there were no spare anti-aircraft batteries available. Anti- aircraft cover had been requested from BAFF in early June, but there were no units to spare and the only option left was to ask the French to assist. They also had no units available in the area[.1] This lack of cover put the operation in jeopardy as the Air Ministry reminded BAFF on 4th June.[2] On 6th June the question base port defence of Nantes was raised and it was found that the 53rd HAA Regiment could be spared. The Regiment was to be sent to defend Salon and Le Vallon without delay.

The 53rd Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment was a territorial regiment which had been sent to France in early October 1939 as part of the 12th Anti-Aircraft Brigade. The formation of this unit had been ordered by the War Office on 9th October 19393 and it was given the task of defending the airfields of the AASF around Rheims.

When the German advance reached the Rheims area during the early hours of 16th May 1940 the prearranged signal for the withdrawal of the Regiment was received. As the Emergency Move Orders were in two 'stages', and it was not clear whether these 'stages' were to apply the Commander of 157th Battery rushed to RHQ for clarification from the Commanding Officer. On being told to "get out" as quickly as possible due to the advancing enemy, 157th Battery withdrew. Only the a third of the Battery's guns had been prepared for road transport and therefore only the personnel and instruments were evacuated from the majority of the gunsites. Sixteen of the Regiment's twenty four 3" guns were left behind.[4]

The 17th May found the 157th Battery in the area around Troyes to the South of Rheims. The 17th and 18th May were spent salvaging the guns and the storesleft behind in the haste to evacuate the gunsites. All the Battery's guns were recovered together with most of the stores and ammunition, but the salvage operation had to be stopped on the 19th following the capture of 2 Officers (including the Chaplain) and 5 men on a salvage mission.[5]

Brigadier W Crewsdon the Commanding Officer of the 12th AA Brigade felt that the 53rd had "exceeded the evacuation order".[6] The excesses included smashing the guns which left only four of the 53rd's guns fit for repair in the field; eighteen guns had been recovered in total. It was decided that "the 53rd HAA Regiment must therefore suffer for the good of the whole AASF".[7] Of the three Batteries that made up the 53rd, the 158th Battery together with eight officers and 173 men from 157th and 159th Batteries were to remain with the 12th AA Brigade. With the men also went the best part of the Regiment's instruments and transport. What was left of the 53rd was ordered to proceed to Nantes with the fourteen guns that were out of action. There they were to join the defence of the port and get the guns repaired. The 53rd remained part of the 12th AA Brigade, but never rejoined it in France.

What remained of the 53rd Regiment left the Troyes area on 22nd May delayed due to loading difficulties. Loading was difficult with each gun having to be manhandled on to a truck which was ten inches above the siding platform. Two of the guns broke through the trucks and had to be hauled back and reloaded elsewhere. Luck continued to go against the 53rd when one gun fell through its truck while the train was moving. In the early hours of 23rd May the 53rd arrived in Nantes with fourteen damaged guns to assist with the defence of the port.

The train was unloaded immediately it arrived so as to expedite the repair of the guns which together with the gunnery instruments were delivered to the ordnance repair unit for repair and overhaul. The men put under canvas and by the end of May, 157th Battery had three guns back in action. These were immediately deployed to provide anti-aircraft cover for Nantes; by 5th June six guns were back in action.

Lieutenant Colonel V R Krohn RA, Officer Commanding  the 53rd HAA Regiment was telephoned on 6th June by BAFF to confirm the details of the strength of his Regiment. Krohn said he could man 6 gun positions with 13 guns but that as the Regiment was the only defence at Nantes he couldn't be spared. He also said that due to the lack of motor transport the Regiment would need a train. The need for anti-aircraft cover for 'Haddock' was so great and the 53rd was the only available unit, that transport problems could easily be overcome. Following this call, the Brigade Major of the 12th AA Brigade was contacted at 1933 hrs., and he confirmed that Krohn was suitable for the job9.Later the same evening in Nantes, Krohn issued an order that the Regiment was to be ready to move within 48 hours of 0900 hrs. on 7th June.

This was the situation on 7th June when BAFF was able to confirm to the Air Ministry that anti-aircraft cover would be available for 'Haddock' in the form of thirteen 3" guns (one gun was to remain in Nantes and was to follow when repairs had been completed) and four Bofors guns.

The 3" gun with which the 53rd was equipped was obsolete by the outbreak of war as it could not hit aircraft flying at 20,000 feet or more.[8] The planners of 'Haddock' must have hoped that any Italian attack on Salon would be at low level so as to give the gunners a chance.

The entraining, ordered late on  6th June, was completed later than scheduled on the 9th, but despite 46 hours on the train the 53rd Regiment was, as planned, ready for action at first light on 12th June.[10]

Notes

1          AIR 35 157 15A

2          AIR 35 157 16A

3          WO 167 443 Appendix to Bde. Diary

4          WO 167 637 August '39 to June '40

5          WO 167 443 October '39 to June '40

6          WO 167 443 October '39 to June '40

7          WO 167 617 September '39 to June '40

8          AIR 35 81  Re-equipment with 3.7" guns had been hoped for but this as    prevented by the German invasion

9          AIR 35 157 19A

10        AIR 35 157 22A

RAF Haddock Force June 1940 Part 3

Chapter 1 

Final Part with references from National Archive

While these preparations were going on Wing Commander Field was kept busy meeting the local French commanders to ensure the smooth running of the operation. Amongst the commanders he met on 9th June was a Captain of the French Naval Air Arm with whom flying restrictions and identification was discussed as these differed from those of the French Air Force.

The bombers for the force were to be Wellingtons [13] of No.3 Group Bomber Command and the operational instructions of AOC No.3 Group were delivered by Group Captain Harrison on 8th June; he returned to England on 9th June. The bomber operations were under the control of the AOC in C Bomber Command at his HQ in High Wycombe [14] through AOC No.3 Group. The bomber squadrons were still to be based in England and were only using the airfields around Marseilles as advanced landing grounds. Wing Commander Field who was Officer Commanding 'Haddock' was therefore under the administrative control of BAFF HQ and operational control of AOC in C Bomber Command.[15]

On 9th June, just 5 days after Wing Commander Field had first arrived at Salon, he was able to report to 'Eagle' (BAFF HQ) that 'Haddock' would be ready to operate on 10th June. The 10th saw the installation of an R.F.D/F Station and further last minute preparations before the arrival of the bombers. Also a very important cypher arrived from the Air Ministry [16] during the day, stating that Britain would be at war with Italy from 0001 hrs. 11th June. The first attack was scheduled for the night of 11-12th June.

The operation was to be carried out by twelve aircraft from two squadrons within No.3 Group. The plan was that the aircraft would fly down to Salon during the afternoon and carry out an attack the same evening. The next day the aircraft would be readied for an attack that night, and after returning from the raid, they would be refuelled and flown back to England probably passing the 12 aircraft heading for Salon, on the way to replace them. The stay in France was therefore three days in which time two attacks could be carried out; this method of operation required the minimum number of ground parties to be flown in from England. With the Germans occupying much of Northern France, the aircraft were routed away from trouble. They flew from their airfields in Suffolk to Poole followed by St Cast, Nantes, Bordeaux, Castres, Arles and on to Salon or Le Vallon. The list prepared showing the squadrons supplying aircraft rather optimistically goes down to 26th June 1940. [17]

All was set at Salon for the arrival of bombers, which in keeping with the fishy theme, were referred to as baskets of fish.[18] The Wellington bombers were expected to arrive at 1500 hrs. on 11th June and a message from 'Haddock' confirmed that all twelve aircraft had arrived safely between 1530 hrs. and 1615 hrs.[19]

Notes

1          AIR 35 158 1A

2          AIR 35 158 20A

3          AIR 35 74  1A

4          AIR 35 158 18A

5          AIR 35 74  3A

6          AIR 35 74  7A

7          AIR 35 157 1A

8          AIR 35 157 7A

9          AIR 35 157 5A

10        AIR 35 157 8A

11        AIR 25 51/58 (Appendix) B.150

12        AIR 26 97 Diary for May 1940

13        AIR 35 157 10A

14        AIR 35 157 No number on document but dated 7/6/40.

15        AIR 25 51/58 (Appendix) B.148

16        AIR 35 157 31A

17        AIR 25 51/58 (Appendix) B.148

18        AIR 35 323 4A          "Told Haddock that the first basket of fish is being dispatched. They are prepared to receive them at any time." This is written in pencil at the bottom of 4A and is apparently a message to BAFF from Bomber Command.

19        AIR 35 157 35A

Chapter 2 to follow

RAF Haddock Force June 1940 Part 2

Chapter 1 Part 2

In a letter also of 9th May addressed to Vuillemin, Barratt proposed a compromise to the the French Air Forces' lack of co-operation in supplying the ground support required for an operation that had been planned as a joint venture. The Air Marshall proposed that the French supply servicing and transport companies which would be used only until replacements arrived from England. This would prevent any delay in the operation. Replying to this letter on 16th May, Vuillemin agreed and placed at the RAF's disposal the three aerodromes and also agreed to supply the service and transport units required on the proviso that they were returned to the French for service elsewhere as soon as RAF replacements arrived.

Following the invasion of France and the Low Countries by Germany on 10th May 1940 plans for attacking Italy were shelved. Italy still remained out of the war during May but with Hitler's incredible successes, of which Mussolini was kept informed by Hitler himself, the temptation to join Germany and profit from the spoils of war became too great. On the 30th May Mussolini wrote to Hitler informing him that Italy would declare war on the Allies on 5th June. This was inconvenient to Hitler who asked for a postponement of 3 days for the Luftwaffe to deliver the knock out blow to the French Air Force. Mussolini could only agee and postponed his declaration of war to the 10th June.

During this period the French Government was aware of the stiffening of the Italian attitude and attempted to buy off the Italians with proposals involving her territories in North Africa. Mussolini though was eager to gain military prestige and glory and nothing was going to stop him from going to war.

           

Therefore as the British Expeditionary Force was being evacuated from Dunkirk the deterioration of relations between the Allies and Italy caused the plans for a joint aerial attack on Italy to be reinstated.

In a letter[7] from Air Commodore J C Slessor, the Director of Plans to Air Marshal Sir Charles F A Portal AOC in C Bomber Command an update was given of the situation regarding plans for the attack. BAFF had been informed that the French Air Force would now be unlikely to be able to assist in an attack on Italy, because of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Northern France and the reinforcement of the belief by the French that any attack on Italy should be purely retaliatory.

The earlier hopes of breaking Italian morale were now abandoned as distances involved were too great for the RAF alone to keep up the effort that would be required. It was still felt though, that if a sharp surprise blow could be achieved on the declaration of war an important physcological advantage could be gained. Although the attack had now become an RAF operation using the French airfields at Salon and Le Vallon, it was stressed that an attack would not go ahead without consent from the French[8]

With the operation beginning to take shape by the end of May, BAFF requested a code name for the bomber force.[9] The Air Ministry replied the next day (1st June) with the uninspired and uninspiring code name of 'Haddock'.[10]

The airfields to be used were Salon and Le Vallon near Marseilles, which had been put at the disposal of the RAF in May 1940. The airfield at Salon was situated about two miles south of the town of Salon. It consisted of two long narrow airfields separated by the main Avignon - Marseilles road. The western half was designated for use by 'Haddock' and the French Air Force was still using the eastern half, but movement of aircraft between the two halves was possible. The surface of the airfield was grass. Eight and a half miles to the west of Salon town was Le Vallon airfield. This had a flat, clear approach to a grass surface but dust was not a problem as the low scrub kept it down. Vehicular access was good with the airfield just to the south of the Salon - Arles road.[11]

The man who was to be in charge of the operational and refuelling bases for 'Haddock' at the two airfields was Group Captain R M Field of No.71 Wing Headquarters, which had been in Nantes since 22nd May.[12] Field received verbal instructions for the formation of the ground support for 'Haddock' on the morning of 3rd June from SASO (Senior Air Staff Officer) BAFF Air Vice Marshall Evill. Warning of its iminent formation had already been given to the units concerned based at No.2 Base Area, Nantes, on 2nd June. The Administative Instruction was ready to be issued by 1730 hrs on 3rd June. It was issued to No.71 Wing HQ and Nos. 16 and 17 Servicing Flights (having recently arrived from Cherbourg) after Field had flown to Nantes from Orleans. These units moved off between 0400 hrs and 0600 hrs on 4th June by both road and rail.

While the operation for the attack against Italy was being prepared a high level meeting was taking place at the French Admiralty in Paris. Amongst those present on 3rd June were Admiral Darlan and Air Marshall Barratt and several proposals were put forward regarding attacks on Italy should war be declared. The first of these proposals was 'Haddock' which was just getting under way. The French said that fighter support could be given in the Marseilles area if the RAF relieved French fighter by sending further squadrons to Northern France. The French felt that British fighters would help to stop the Germans, but Churchill felt they would be needed to defend Britain later. The third option was a joint attack by the French Navy and Air Force on coastal targets between Genoa and Leghorn; a dawn strike on 14th June took the Italians by surprise and proved to be more successful than 'Haddock'. Finally it was proposed the Fleet Air Arm aircraft that were based at Hyeres were to be at the disposal of the French for mine laying operations. 

Field was flown to Marseilles where he was introduced to the Officer Commanding the British Military Sub Area, Brigadier Dawes. Following this meeting Field was driven with his RAF Liason Officer to the airfield at Salon (this had been given the code name 'Herring'). Here they received a warm welcome from General de Division Houderon, who was in charge of the 'Zones des Operations Aeriennes des Alpes'. This was perhaps the high point of relations between the RAF and the French Air Force at Salon, helped by the fact that Houderon and Field were old friends; this good start though, did not help prevent the misunderstandings and the breakdown in relations later.

The next day, 5th June, was spent organising the billets and a Headquarters for the operation. This was located at Chateau de Richards 3km to the north of Salon. Field was helped in this task by having his own car and driver, which had arrived the previous afternoon after a 430 mile drive from BAFF HQ. The journey from Nantes was considerably longer at 700 miles and so it was not until the evening of the 6th June that the fast convoy of No.71 Wing HQ arrived together with No.17 Servicing Flight and No.1 Heavy Mobile W/T Unit. The latter was perhaps the most important as it gave 'Haddock' direct contact with the Air Ministry in London.

The need for intelligence about Italy's readiness for war was solved with the return of Field from Orleans, where he had made a progress report on 7th June. He brought with him Squadron Leader R B Donovan to collect the relevant material.

By this time Salon was beginning to fill with RAF units and supplies. On 7th June a Meteorological Section arrived together with the rail parties of both Nos.16 and 17 Servicing Flights and a road convoy of No.16 Servicing Flight. Over 8th and 9th June 391 tons of fuel was unloaded by the RAF from a petrol train at the rail head, and distributed between the airfields at Salon and Le Vallon. An ammunition train also arrived on 8th June and took the French until noon on the 10th June to unload. This consisted of 343 tons of ammunition.

RAF Haddock Force June 1940 Part 1

This is part one of an article I have written on the RAF's Haddock Force.  It is based on research I carried out at the National Archive.  I will publish each part over the next week to coincide with the 75th anniversary of Haddock Force.

Haddock Force - France, June 1940

Chapter 1

"On this tenth day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger struck it into the back of his neighbour." In this way Roosevelt described Mussolini's declaration of war on an already war torn France.

The declaration of war by Italy had been anticipated by Britain and France since the outbreak of war in September 1939, when Mussolini, despite the aggressively worded Pact of Steel, wrote and informed Hitler that,

"if Poland and the latters allies open a counterattack against Germany, I inform you in advance that it will be opportune for me not to take the initiative in military operations in view of the present state of Italian war preparations, of which we have repeatedly and in good time informed you"

Opinion was divided over support for Germany amongst the Fascist leadership. Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister and son-in-law of Mussolini, records in his diary for the period, his growing feelings that the Germans had taken advantage of Italy and would not hesitate to do so again. Mussolini was torn between upholding Italian honour by fulfilling his obligations to Germany as set out in the Pact of Steel and the knowledge that the Italian Army and Air Force were under strength for a war of any length.

During the period from September 1939 to June 1940 Italy was in a state of "neutrality", or more accurately a state of non-belligerent support for the Germans. Relations with the Allies, that at times had been cordial, became strained during early 1940 and deteriorated rapidly after the German invasion of France and the Low Countries on 10th May 1940.

The pro-German stance of the Italian Leadership was taken into account by the Allied High Command and military plans were prepared for use in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. At the Ninth meeting of the Supreme War Council resolution 2(2) was passed in which both the French and British governments agreed to consider the question of an air attack on North Western Italy in the event of the Allies declaring war on Italy. As a preliminary step it was agreed that the Air Staffs of both countries should reconoitre aerodromes for this purpose and draw up a plan, so that an attack could take place immediately. M. Reynaud, the French premier,  was worried by the consequences of such an attack which he hoped would not take place until the anti-aircraft defences of the French industrial areas were complete.

Despite Reynaud's reservations, a message was received at the Headquarters of the British Air Forces in France (BAFF) on 26th April 1940 from the Air Ministry in London, part of which read,

"In the event of a serious deteriation of the situation vis a vis Italy it would be desirable to have ready in advance an administrative plan to enable us to operate British Bombers against objectives in Northwest Italy should circumstances permit"[1]

Général Joseph Vuillemin the Commander of the Armée de l'Air immediately offered the RAF the use of several aerodromes located in the area around Marseilles, but these were rejected on two counts; firstly as being too open and thus prone to surprise attack by the Italian Air Force coming from the sea, and secondly the lacking in suitable accommodation for the personnel.[2] After some discussion BAFF were permitted to reconoitre and report back on the suitability of the aerodromes in the Lyons area.

Wing Commander D. MacFadyen was sent by the BAFF together with Capitaine Vieugeot of the Armée de l'Air, who acted as his guide.The object of the reconnaisance was to was sent by BAFF to report on the suitability of the aerodromes in the Lyon area for heavy bomber operations. After having visited six aerodromes that the French were willing to put at the disposal of the RAF, MacFadyen submitted a written report on 30th April2 in which he concluded only three of the aerodromes could be considered for bomber operations, and one of the three was not suitable for night operations. On the 2nd and 3rd May MacFadyen visited a further five aerodromes this time in the Avignon district, but again none of these was suitable.

At the end of his report on the Avignon reconnaissance dated 6th May[3], MacFadyen noted the opinion of his new guide, a Commandant Dezarrois, on the facilities at the aerodrome at Salon, near Marseilles. These included 2 hangers, bulk petrol installations, accommodation for 600 men and the proximity of 11 relief landing grounds including Vallon and Marderve. These were presumably the aerodromes previously offered to the RAF by Général Vuillemin, and are  recommended by MacFadyen due to the lack of suitable aerodromes in the Lyon and Avignon areas, despite their previous rejection.

The geography of the areas checked also had a bearing on the choice by the RAF. An area that was free of mountains and within easy striking distance of the industrial area of Northwest Italy were important  factors and ones which were not found around Lyon and Avignon. The 'Crau' district around Marseilles was ideal, being flat and only about 150 miles from the Italian border.

Whilst these reconnaisances were being undertaken the administrative side of the attack was being planned at BAFF Headquarters. BAFF was to be in charge of the administrative arrangements and thus was responsible for the supply of petrol, bombs, servicing personnel and suitable accommodation for what was hoped to be an intensive campaign, which would produce a knock out blow to the Italian war industry.

In a paper entitled "Note on an Air Offensive against Italy"[4] prepared in early May it is suggested that the attacks from Southern France could completely destroy Italian industry, in particular the aircraft industry; the Caproni works were based at Milan and the Fiat works at Turin produced aero engines. It is stated in the paper that the clear summer nights would favour the attacker, which is ironic as the weather at the time of the actual attack proved to be more prohibitive to its successful prosecution than the enemy.

Air Marshall Sir Arthur Barratt AOC in C BAFF met Général Vuillemin to discuss the availability to the RAF of the aerodromes at Salon, Vallon and Marderve and in a letter to the Air Ministry4 following Vuillemin's agreement in principal to the RAF using the three aerodromes, he set out his thoughts on the operation.

Barratt was concerned by the fact that the French had gone back on a promise made on 5th May to supply Air Companies to service the RAF bombers. This would mean having to supply service sections from the Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF), which was difficult as the heavy bomber servicing flights which were in France with the AASF were leaving shortly for England. This would cause a problem if, as was envisaged, heavy bomber squadrons were to be used to attack Italy. The French, it was hoped, would reconsider and release the promised Air Companies. Barratt's remaining difficulty with Salon was the transport problem caused by the distance between the rail-head and the aerodrome.

During the discussions, Vuillemin had made it clear to Barratt that he would not try to persuade the French government to make the opening attack on Italy, as he considered that any attack should be purely retaliatory. As early as 3rd May the Air Ministry had asked BAFF to make an official approach to the French Government to get the French Air Force to undertake responsibility for operations against Italy, but this attempt had obviously failed. This indication that French support for an immediate air strike against Italy was not complete was perhaps the first sign of trouble, which culminated in the farcical events of the night of 11th/12th June.

6 June 1940 53rd HAA Regiment Diary

On 4 June 1940, the Regimental diary of 53rd HAA Regent recorded the completion of Operation Dynamo, the evacuation from Dunkirk. The Regiment, however, remained in France.

On 6 June 1940 (4 years away from D Day) the 53rd remained part of 12th AA Brigade and the Regiment remained "on loan" for the defenseman of Nantes.

The 157th HAA Battery had 6 guns ready for action but there was no air activity. The Battery continued with field works.

Letter Home 2 June 1940

This letter, written on 2 June 1940 made it out of France and back to England.  It is impressive how the Army Post Office kept function as the Battle of France became more desperate.

Rage and Fury of the "Battle of the Bulge"

The term "Battle of the Bulge" was not new in December 1944.  The phrase was used in May 1940 to describe the opening phase of the German breakout through in to France.  This article was published in The war Illustrated on 31 May 1940 and describes the opening of the Battle of France, with only a slight indication that it wasn't going to end in the favour of France.

Opening on May 14, what came to be described as the "Battle of the Bulge" soon developed into a conflict of earth shaking importance.  Here we tell of its initial phase, up to the end of the first week's fighting.

"The fate of our country and that of our Allies, the destinies of the world, depend on the battle now in progress."  So began an Order of the Day issued by General Gamelin on Friday, 17 May.  "Any soldier who cannot advance" continued the Allied Generalissimo, "should allow himself to be killed rather than abandon that part of our national soil which has been entrusted to him.  As always in grave hours of our history, the order today is 'Conquer or die.' We must conquer."  Grave words, but not too grave for the crisis which in the course of a few short days had developed in the Western battle zone.

At the beginning of the week the German thrust seemed to be centred in Belgium, whose army, in touch with the Dutch remnant to the north, strongly supported by the British Expeditionary Force in the centre and closely linked with the French on the right, was slowly retreating on the line Antwerp-Brussels-Namur.  Suddenly on Tuesday, May 14, a new and far greater battle developed to the south in the Ardennes.  "On the Meuse south of Namur," ran the French war communique issued at 10.30 on the night of that fateful day, "the Germans have attempted to cross the river at several points.  We have launched counter-attacks and the fighting continues, more especially in the region of Sedan, where the enemy is making a momentous effort with furious obstinacy and at the expense of heavy casualties."

Onslaught on an Unprecedented Scale

Soon it was apparent that the French line from Montmedy, where the deep underground works of the Maginot Line terminate, to Maubeuge was cracking; indeed at several points the line was actually pierced and through the gap poured German armoured columns consisting of vast numbers of tanks, their way blasted open by a veritable armada of warplanes.  For an onslaught on such unprecedented scale the French defenders were unprepared; their ranks, apparently, had been depleted by the dispatch of their reserves to aid the threatened front in Belgium to the norht.  Despite the most desperate efforts to hold up the attack and to establish a fresh front, the German onrush continued with unabated fury.  In a comparatively few hours General Corap's Ninth Army had met disaster, a 90 mile front had been overrun, and like a three pronged fork the Germans plunged towards the very heart of France.

A French War Office spokesman described the onslaught as "a great hurricane."  The French infantry, he declared, had resisted admirably, but, faced at certain points by overwhelming mass of tank units, they have been obliged to give way.  Once through the gap, the tanks spread out fanwise in all directions until the battle took on what one of the French war communiques described s "the aspect of a terrible melee."  Here and there there was fierce hand to hand fighting, and for the first time in history there were battles on a grand scale between the tanks of the rival armies.

By now, however, it was too late to effect real consolidation, and for several days more the French were compelled to fall back, abandoning town after town to the hated enemy.  The real war had come at last to the Western Front - the real war, not of fixed positions, but of a struggle in the open.

There was no line; nothing, indeed, in the nature of an established front.  Over the French countryside roamed at large 2,500, or it may be 3,000, German tanks - estimated to constitute at least half of the enemy's tank divisions - in individual units, in small detachments, or in great masses.  Furthermore, as the battle developed, tens of thousands of Nazi motor-cyclists, armed to the teeth, were dispatched to harry and ravage far in front of the main fight.

By the end of the week a great bulge had been formed in the Allied line between Maubeuge and Sedan, reaching out into north-east France as far as Rethel on the Aisne.  And the bulge was getting bigger day by day, almost hour by hour.  Drastic measures were called for if disaster were to be averted.  Mr Churchill went to Paris, where in conference with the French chiefs means were devised for the common defense.  The French armies were regrouped; and Britain's magnificent air force, which had already established its mastery over the Nazis, was flung into the fight against the ravaging tanks.  In the north the Allied line was falling back in order to conform with the new situation, and Germany was jubilant over the capture of Brussels and Antwerp.

But though the situation was grave, as M. Reynaud admitted in his broadcast to the nation on the evening of Saturday, May 18, it was by no means desperate.  "It is in such circumstances as these," he declared, "that the French people show what is in them."  He announced that he had called to his side Marshall Petain, the victor of Verdun; and on the following evening the world was electrified by the news that another of the triumphant figures of the Great War, General Weygand, had been appointed to the Supreme Command in place of General Gamelin.  His appointment was widely hailed as an augury of victory, for Weygand was Foch's closest collaborator in 1918 when the German hordes thundering on the way to Paris were halted, and at length chased across the frontier.

But at that moment it needed faith and vision to talk or think of victory.  When M. Reynaud faced the Senate on May 21 his first words were "the country is in danger," and he went on to tell how by a series of "incredible mistakes" the bridges over the Meuse had not been destroyed, and when across these bridges there passed the German "Panzer" (iron-clad) divisions they encountered nothing but French units who were "scattered ill-cadred, and badly trained."  With the total disorganisation of General Corap's Ninth Army the hinge of the French army had been broken.  The Premier went on to tell how a huge breach had been opened in the front, and that already the Germans had penetrated as far as Arras and Amiens.  "The truth is," he went on, "that our classic conception of the conduct of war has come up against a new conception" - one which combines the massive use of heavy armoured divisions in cooperation with aeroplanes and the creation of disorder in the rear by means of parachute raids.

As that black day dragged on there came news of still more disasters.  General Giraud, newly appointed commander of the French Ninth Army, was said to be taken prisoner by the Germans with the whole of his staff, and to the towns which had been reached by their advanced mechanised    forces was added Abbeville, only 15 miles from the English Channel.  Arras, where only a few days before had been Lord Gort's headquarters, was the scene of fierce street fighting, and Amiens was largely in flames.  (Arras, indeed was stated on 22nd to have been recaptured, and so fluid was the situation that important fighting developed in the Cambrai-Vallencennes area, 25 miles behind Arras itself.)  In a huge area of Northern France not a building of any description remained undamaged, as the invader systematically destroyed all that came within his path.  The Channel ports on which the British Army was now withdrawing - in unbroken order and in good heart - were being heavily bombed.

It was worse than 1914, worse even than 1918.  It was the hour of supreme crisis, the hour in which the tick of every second would have its echo through untold centuries.

157th HAA Battery Diary entries 21 to 25 May 1940

Five days of diary entry for 157th HAA Battery as it regroups in Nantes.

21/5/40

0400 Preparation for evacuation of Battery to NANTES No.2 Base Sub Area. Orders issued that Battery would move at 1200 hours.

1145 Battery column assembled. Took cover while a few bombs were dropped on area.

1200 Column moved off. Destination railway station ROUILLY-GEROUDOT road

1345 Battery column complete arrived at destination. Many evacuees on roads. Loading of guns commenced immediately. This was a very difficult task as guns had to be side loaded on to trucks about 10 inches above siding platform. All guns were manhandled on to trucks one or two breaking through truck floors and having to be hauled up and moved. Tasks completed and train ready to move approx. 2200 hours.

1900 Road party moved off at approx. 1900 hours.

22/5/40

0500 Journey in progress. One gun broke through truck floor during journey had to be man handled to fresh position on truck.

NANTES

23/5/40

0300 Trained arrived NANTES. Off loading commenced immediately. All guns and instruments delivered to Ordnance repair and overhaul. Personnel placed under canvas at CHATEUX LOMBARDIRIE, NANTES.

24/5/40

0800 "Stocktaking" of stores, personnel etc. Reconnaisance of three gun positions south of river LOIRE carried out by Battery Commander. Redistribution of personnel with three sections (ie 2 - Two guns and 1 - Three guns). Fitters and working parties sent to Ordnance to assist with guns and instruments.

25/5/40

0800 Map ENVIRONS DE NANTES (PROJECTION LAMBERT - II - ZONE CENTRALE)

Locations 157 Bty HQ CHAU BALINIERE
P I LA METAIRIE
P 2 JAGUIERE
P 3 LA RONJONIERE
One section (Lt. Ross) deployed to P 3. Personnel under canvas

1600 One gun in action P 3. Enemy air activity NIL (in area)

157th Battery Diary entries 21 and 22 May 1940

Diary entries for 21 and 22 May 1940 recording the journey to Nantes.

21/5/40

0400 Preparation for evacuation of Battery to NANTES No.2 Base Sub Area. Orders issued that Battery would move at 1200 hours.

1145 Battery column assembled. Took cover while a few bombs were dropped on area.

1200 Column moved off. Destination railway station ROUILLY-GEROUDOT road

1345 Battery column complete arrived at destination. Many evacuees on roads. Loading of guns commenced immediately. This was a very difficult task as guns had to be side loaded on to trucks about 10 inches above siding platform. All guns were manhandled on to trucks one or two breaking through truck floors and having to be hauled up and moved. Tasks completed and train ready to move approx. 2200 hours.

1900 Road party moved off at approx. 1900 hours.

22/5/40

0500 Journey in progress. One gun broke through truck floor during journey had to be man handled to fresh position on truck.

The Evacuation of the 157th Battery 16 to 20 1940

Just after midnight on the seventh day of the Battle of France a top secret urgent order was issued consisting of one word, "SCRAM". It was recieved in the Battery HQ of 157th Battery by Rogers, who was on duty that night. The message he noted down was the command for the 157th HAA Battery to evacuate the AASF airfields that they had been defending in the area around Reims for the past 6 months. The chaotic scenes that followed were not in line with agreed evacuation orders and resulted in the 53rd HAA Regiment being split up a few days later.

The breakout of the German army from Sedan on 14 May 1940 led to secret plans being issued for the move of the AASF from the area around Reims, where both the RAF and members of the British Territorial Army had been stationed since late September 1939. The plan was to evacuate the AASF south to the area around Troyes. By 15 May 1940 the Germans were reported to be in the Reims area and preparation for the evacuation of the anti aircraft regiments defending the AASF airfields was commenced. All the guns were in action all day gun walls were removed and stores were packed in readiness.

The orders, which were marked "Secret", were issued by 12th Anti Aircraft Brigade on 14 May to 53rd Regiment. They gave detail instructions of how the evacuation would be notified and location of the new airfields the AASF would be operating from. The word "SCRAM" would be issued to from the Brigade Headquarters to start the first part of the move followed by "SCRAM TWO" to initiate the second part of the move. All units were instructed to be ready to move at two hours notice. The plan envisaged a controlled withdrawal of the units down the main road leading from Reims via Louvais, Marevil, Vertus, and terminating at Fere Chamemoise. It further stipulated that all units would move with two days of fresh rations and three days of reserve rations. The Batteries of the 157th, that is PIP I, II and III, were assigned to defend AASF airfields at Anglure, St Lucien Ferme and Echemines.

At 00:40 hours on 16 May, the 53rd Regimental HQ issued the following urgent order to the 157th Battery HQ (codename PIP) in Vezernay.

"SCRAM VERY URGENT Stage III Para. 5 and note."

The intention was to put the first part of the evacuation into effect. However, at 04:30 hours the Officer Commanding 157th HAA Battery issued another order to PIP I. It read:

"Scram immediately - take only predictor - height indicator -Breeches - spotter telescope - personnel. You have one 3 tonner and two 30 cwt. Very urgent. Just rendezvous BERGERE T 28 38 * Ends"

The urgency of the situation is well captured in this brief message which was sent by Major Jim Chivers RA. The hand written record original of the message is on the files at the National Archive in Kew and was written by Rogers, with whom Frank shared his billet whilst in Vezernay. Frank mentions Rogers on several occasions in his letters.

The order of the move in one stage, and not the planned two stages, resulted in the 53rd HAA Regiment leaving behind 16 of their 24 3 inch anti aircraft guns. Stores were also abandoned and the petrol dump was fired.

On the afternoon of 16 May 1940 Lt Col Krohn, the officer commanding of the 53rd HAA Regiment sent a message by Despatch Rider to Major Chivers which read:

'Many valuable stores left at PIP II also canteen stock etc * Send one lorry under responsible NCO with small party of men to collect as much as possible * These HQs now situate VIZZACERF 10.5 kilo's south east of MERY * Report progress your move per this * DR [Despatch Rider]" (File reference National Archive WO167/637)

The failure to implement the evacuation orders in two stages as planned resulted in the firing of the fuel dump which caused the next day when trying to evacuate the 157th Battery to the Troyes area. Whilst the Battery regrouped at Droupt St Marie on 17 and 18 May, the 12th (AA) Brigade was putting plans in place to move the Battery again.

The decision was taken to split the 53rd HAA Regiment and attach the 158th Battery to the 73rd HAA Regiment. This Regiment was tasked with the anti aircraft defence of Nantes. This decision, in time, put the men of the battery on the SS Lancastria which was sunk with great loss of life as it left Nantes later in June 1940. The 12th (AA) Brigade believed that the "SCRAM" evacuation on 15 May had been made more difficult by the "over-reaction of certain units" which resulted in stores and guns having to be salvaged from the airfields around Reims. During one of these salvage operations 2 officers (including the Regimental Chaplain) and 5 other ranks were captured by the Germans. A later review of campaign in France by the 12th (AA) Brigade was damning and concluded that "they [53rd] had exceeded the evacuation order." As a result of the botched evacuation 14 of the 18 guns of the 53rd were left temporarily out of action and had to be sent to Nantes for refitting.

The 53rd (less the 158th Battery) was ordered to move to Rouilly-Geraudot Station on the Troyes to Piney railway line to load and entrain at 17:00 hours on 21 May. The Regiment was ordered to move as much equipment as possible to a concealed position close to the station on 20 May. By this stage the 53rd only had 14 guns remaining and they were further ordered to hand over all their anti tank rifles and ammunition to the 73rd HAA Regiment. The 158th Battery took 176 rounds per gun for their four 3 inch guns and the 53rd was ordered to dump the remaining anti aircraft shells; the 12th (AA) Brigade HQ was to be told the location of the dump, although it was probably never recovered with the rapid advance of the Germans.

Not all of the 53rd Regiment travelled by train on 21 May and a group travelled by road to Nantes in the Regiments remaining motor transport.. The route took them via Sens, Montargis, Orleans, Tours and then to Nantes. Sufficient petrol for 300 miles was carried in the convoy.

Sadly, the 53rd HAA Regiment did not come out of this period well. The panic and chaos caused by the rapid German advance, the rumours of paratroopers, spies and fifth columnists will all have added to the over reaction to the evacuation order early in the morning of 15 May 1940. The Regimental diary recorded on 13 May that "Parachute troops dressed as workmen are reported to have been dropped." Such reports, true or not, led to chaos behind the lines.

The botched evacuation in the early morning of 15 May had a significant impact on the involvement of the Regiment in the rest of the French campaign. Some personnel of the 158th Battery were drowned when the SS Lancastria was sunk and the other two batteries ended up becoming the last Bristish regiment to be formally evacuated from France when they left Marseille on 18 June 1940.

157th HAA Battery Diary entries 19 and 20 May 1940

German Panzers made it to Amiens on the afternoon of 19 May 1940 cutting the AASF off from the BEF.  The territorial soldiers of the 157th HAA Battery 53rd HAA (City of London) Regiment were now cut off from the channel coast and the BEF and received orders to head for Nantes.

The diary entries for 19 and 20 May 1940 read as follows:

19/05/40

08:00 Orders received that no further salvage forces will be sent out.  Two guns in action ST LUCIEN FERME.  One in action POUAN (EAST).  One in action POUAN (WEST).  Preliminary instructions received re. reorganisation of 12th (Anti Aircraft) Brigade.

20/05/40

08:00 Detailed instructions received re. reorganisation of 12th (Anti Aircraft) Brigade received and put into action.  Transfer of personnel carried out and equipment handed over.
Instructions re. move of remainder of Battery to Nantes received.

Parachute Troops Bring War from the Skies

This article was published in The War Illustrated on 24 May 1940.

In the opening days of "total war" on the Western Front the Nazis made great use of their parachute troops.  Some account of these well armed desperadoes, who created much confusion and havoc behind the lines in Holland, is given here.

From just before dawn on May 10 the sky above the Low Countries was often filled with black blobs dangling from silvery parachutes dropping slowly into woods and fields far behind the zone of the fiercest fighting.

News of their approach kept the Dutch radio fully occupied.  "Waves of German parachutists are coming over," said Hilversum; "keep a sharp look out for them"; and from Brussels there came similar warnings.  Dropped from flights of three to five machines, the parachutists descended close to the principal strategic centres and the most vital aerodromes - to mention but a few, near Delft, only 13 miles from The Hague; at Waalhaven, Rotterdam's principal airport, where they joined hands with German troops who had been landed from transports and flying boats;  Dordrecht; Gouda, near Amsterdam; and Hooge Zwaluwe, where what only a short time before would have been regarded as fantastic project - the seizure of the Dutch sovereign and the Netherlands Government.

Armed with machine guns or mortars and pistols, and equipped with steel helmets, gas masks, binoculars, portable wireless sets, explosives, tents, and folding bicycles - these airborne arsenals silently dropped to earth, and if their advent had been undetected, crept away through the grass or trees on their nefarious missions.  Some kept a sharp lookout for Dutch military movements and at once used their wireless sets to transmit the information they had gathered to their headquarters behind the German lines, or conveyed it to the dwelling of a traitorous Dutch Nazi or German spy.  Some set about the blowing up of bridges and railways and the destruction of telegraph lines, while other with machine guns strove to prevent the demolition by the Dutch of their dykes and bridgeheads.

Such work calls for military qualities of a high order, and these Nazi storm troops of 1940 pattern were picked men, resolute to do or die in their allotted tasks.  It is true that the Dutch reported the discovery of the corpses of several parachutists who had obviously been shot in the back - presumably by their officers in the 'plane when they had displayed an undue reluctance to take the drop into space. These must have been exceptions, however, judging from the amount of damage which the parachutists were able to effect.  Quite apart from this material havoc there was what may be described as their "nuisance value" and their influence on the morale of a people even so phlegmatically resolute as the Dutch.

In many cases, it was alleged, the parachutists were disguised in Dutch uniforms or in the uniforms of the British or French troops.  Moreover, there were well authenticated reports of them having landed dressed as clergymen, peasants , and even as women and girls.  So disguised, their passage through the countryside may well have been facilitated, so that they were enabled to approach their objectives without arousing suspicion.

Such a breach of military usage was indignantly denounced by the Dutch Government, and some at least f the disguised soldiers were shot out of hand as spies.  The German official news agency replied by threatening "immediate and most violent reprisals" for any such "ill treatment" of their parachutists.  The parachute pilots it asserted were part of the German regular army, and "their special uniform is not camouflaged and cannot be mistaken either for the uniform of foreign armies or civilian clothes."  For every parachutist so "ill treated" they would shoot ten prisoners.  "The young German army is proud of its parachute pilots."

Not only in Holland did the parachutists present a constant threat, but in Belgium and even in little Luxemburg - which, indeed, was captured in the course of a few hours by parachute troops.  While the Dutch and Belgian soldiers, aided y their French and British allies, were valiantly resisting the Nazi hordes in the battle zone along the Eastern frontier, for scores of miles behind them in the very heart of the countries they were defending, the parachute troops of the enemy were doing their utmost to stab the defenders in the back.

157th HAA Battery Diary entry 18 May 1940

The Diary entry for 18 May 1940 gives the new positions for the Battery as it is pushed west by the German advance.  The salvage from the old gunsites continues, allowing the guns to operate again.

18/5/40

0800 Further salvage parties sent to old gunsites for guns and stores. New positions at ST LUCIEN FERME and PUAN reconnoitered by Battery Commander.

1140 Two guns on site at ST LUCIEN FERME.

1330 One gun on site at POUAN (EAST).

1715 Two guns in action ST LUCIEN FERME. Two guns on site POUAN (WEST). All guns recovered together with practically all stores and ammunition.

16 May 1940 - Code Word "SCRAM" Issued as Germans Advance

The rapid German advance is causing chaos and confusion behind the Allied lines.  The Code word "SCRAM" is issued resulting in the rapid evacuation of the 157th HAA Battery from their positions on the airfields of the AASF.  The use of the word "SCRAM" as an order to evacuate just adds to the sense of panic and chaos ensued.

This post is made even more interesting by the comments provided from another member of the 157th HAA Battery for which I am very grateful.

To read the diary entry, follow the link below to entry on my blog.

16 May 1940 Code Word "SCRAM" Issued

157th HAA Battery Diary entry 15 May 1940

The 157th Heavy Anti Aircraft Battery continues to play an active role in the battle against the Luftwaffe.  After 6 months of preparing their positions e order is given to prepare to evacuate the guns sites on only the sixth day of the battle.

15/05/40

04:00 Considerable enemy air activity.  Pointer rounds fired by both gun stations.

08:16 One Do. 17 brought down by Hurricanes.  Many pointer rounds fired.  AUBERIVE Aerodrome bombed.  Considerable bombing and aerial combats in REIMS area.  At least two enemy planes seen to be brought down by fighters.  Emergency move orders issued and explained to Station Commanders.

09:35 Instructions received to prepare for moving guns.  Sections in action all day.  Gun walls removed and stores packed in readiness.

Holland Overwhelmed in Five Days Campaign

This contemporary account of the capitulation of Holland in May 1940 was published in The War Illustrated on 24 May 1940.  The intensity of the Blitzkrieg an how West was overwhelmed by the German army.

War broke on Holland shortly before dawn on Friday May 10, and by the evening of the following Tuesday, May 14, the Dutch Commander-in-Chief had decided that further resistance was useless and the "Cease Fire" was sounded. Germany's war machine, so long prepared and employed with such ruthless efficiency, had destroyed the indepenence of yet another of the countries of Europe.

When the avalanches of fire and steel swept over the Dutch frontier shortly before dawn on Friday, May 10, the advanced troops of the Netherland Army gradually retired according to pre-arranged plan. Their task was to to hinder, not to hold position which it was generally agreed were militarily indefensible. So, fighting with their stubborn tenacity which has ever characterised their race, the Dutch machine gunners and riflemen withdrew to the first line of defence just in front of the rivers Yssel and Maas.

The Germans were hot in pursuit with forces far superior in number and far better supplied with guns, and by nightfall the battle was joined along the two rivers, while the German parachutists who had landed from 'planes and transports were converting the interior of Holland into a welter of confused battle. That night the Germans, having overrun the "Maastrict Appendix", made the passage of the Maas and entered the town itself. Shortly afterwards owing to one of the two bridges having escaped destruction by the defenders, they crossed the Albert Canal and so gained a foothold in the Belgian defensive positions.

This same day (Saturday) the Germans managed to effect the crossing of the Yassel below Arnhem, while their troops landed by air and from the sea in the vicinity of Rotterdam, continued in a determined effort to capture that great centre of Dutch commercial life. The Dutch seemed, however, to have the position well in hand, and General Winkleman, the Commander in Chief, declared in an order of the day issued that night to his troops theat "the German invasion of Holland has been a failure and the German High Command has made a profound mistake in underrating the Dutch Army."

Already, however, the situation had taken a turn for the worse. By Sunday morning the Germans had crossed the Yssel and Maas in several places, and the Dutch, after destroying as many bridges as possible, were withdrawing to their "waterline" - the flooded area in front of what is called "fortress Holland", the triangle formed by the three cities of Amsterdam, Utrecht and Rotterdam. Practically the whole of northern Hooland had been overrun by the invaders, who had made their appearance on the eastern shore of the Zuyder Zee and from Harlingen were threatening the great dam whihc connects Friesland with the province of North Hooland. Far more serious was the German advance westward from Nymegen, which had the effect of cutting off the main Dutch forces from those operating in the south of Holland, and of course, the Belgians and their Franco-British Allies.

So black was the outlook on the Monday morning (May 13) that no surprise was caused by the announcement that Princess Juliana and later, Queen Wilhelmina, had taken refuge in England. Soon they were followed by the Dutch Government, which had found it impossibe to function in a country involved in total war. By now the German advance through North Brabant has become a rush; their armoured cars had appeared at Langstraat, and they had taken by treachery the vital Moedyk Bridge which crosses the Hollandische Diep connecting North Brabant with South Holland, the very heart of the country. The Germans claimed, indeed, that their advanced detachments had made contact with the German troops fighting in Rotterdam.

Twenty four hours later General Winkleman announced that Dem Halder, the northern point of the province of North Holland and a main military base, was still in Dutch hands, and, so, too was Rotterdam; but Zeeland was still held.

It was now Tuesday afternoon, and the situation was grave in the extreme. "Fortress Hooland" was almost surrounded, and was being attacked simultaneusly from land, sea and air. Rotterdam was bombed furiously in the course of the afternoon, and Utrecht was threatened with similar destruction; both cities surrendered a few hours later. It was hardly surprising then, that early in the evening General Winkleman ordered his troops to cease fighting, and by 7pm the order had been obeyed.

At 1 o'clock in the morning of May 14 the Netherlands Legation in London announced the news.

"The Coonder in Chief of the Netherlands Army has issued a proclamation to the troops concenred that fighting is to cease.

Enemy troops in great numbers have succeeded in crossing the Moerdyk Bridge and in retaking Rotterdam, which had been previously heavily bombarded. Consequently the heart of the country was laid open to the enemy and the main forces of the army behind the Dutchw aterline were threatened by immediate enemy attacks on their rear.

Under these circumstances, and to avoid complete destruction of the country, the C-in-C was of the opinion that further resistance had become useless and therefore was to be abandoned."

So Holland's five day campaign ended.