RAF Haddock Force June 1940 Part 5 (the final part)

This the final part of my article on RAF Haddock Force.  I hope that you have enjoyed finding out about this little known episode of the Battle of France and thank you for taking the time to read it.

Chapter 3

The twelve Wellingtons which arrived at Salon during the afternoon of 11th June were from Nos. 37 and 75 Squadrons; each Squadron provided six aircraft. They had left their base at Feltwell in Norfolk at 0915 hrs. and were under the command of Wing Commander Merton. The maintenance personnel were taken to Honnington, Norfolk, from where they were flown to Salon.[1]

The Wellingtons were bombed-up and refuelled in readiness for the opening blow in the war against Italy. As the RAF ground personnel went about their duties Wing Commander Field received a visitor who was to start what eventually turned into a night of chaos caused by conflicting orders.

The visitor, a Captain from the staff of General Gama, who commanded the 11e Groupment de Bombardment, told Field that the planned operations were not to be carried by either French or English aircraft. But at 1925 hrs. a cypher was received at Salon which contained the orders for the attack to go ahead. Field wrote the next day that,

"Subsequently, I personnally received a large number of telephone messages from various French authorities, as a result of which I telephoned to Headquarters, BAFF, and in due course received two messages, including one from yourself (Air Marshall Barratt), that no cancellation of these orders was intended."[2]

At 2145 hrs. Air Marshall Barratt received an urgent request from General Vuillemin to stop the attack on Italy. Barratt immediately rang the Air Ministry but he was informed that Churchill and General Ismay were in France at General Weygand's headquarters near Orléans. In his memoirs Churchill recalls that dinner was just being served when Ismay was called to the telephone to speak to Barratt. Churchill, Eden, Dill, Weygand and Reynaud left the table to discuss the situation and Reynaud agreed that the attack should go ahead, and the French authorities were not to interfere any further. One factor in favour of allowing the Wellingtons to proceed was that the Whitleys, also attacking Northern Italy the same night, were too far out to be recalled. The planned combined attack would increase the force of the first aerial attack on Italy.

In the meantime Field had been receiving calls from all quarters of the French Government and Armed Forces. One message came from the Headquarters of the 3rd French Army stating, "the cancellation of the contemplated operation for this evening, as transmitted by the Chief of Staff of General Houdemon, was confirmed". Then a member of the staff of the Vice-Admiral Prefet Maratime of Toulon telephoned. The Captain informed Field that the French Government had formerly forbidden an attack to take place.

The messages continued and Field was even requested to telephone General Vuillemin to hear directly that the operation had been cancelled. At 2300 hrs. Barratt spoke to Ismay again who confirmed that with the Whitleys on the way, Britain was committed to the continuation of the operation. Field had been replying to the French calls and orders that he could only accept orders from superior officers under whom he was placed and who had ordered him to proceed. A further confirmation came, when Barratt telephoned Field and ordered that the operation was to proceed.

It was by this time, after midnight, and the Wellingtons had been ready to depart for almost five hours. If they had to wait any longer the operation would have had to have been cancelled because of the danger of the Wellingtons returning after dawn.

At about 0027 Field received a telephone call from Salon informing him that the Wellingtons were unable to take-off. This was because as the aircraft taxied into position to take-off a number of French military lorries were driven onto the runway and parked so as to prevent the operation taking place. The French drivers were under the orders of Commandant Treff, the commanding officer of the remaining French forces on the other side of the airfield at Salon. Field immediately cancelled the operation for the night as he felt that such action could only be countered by force which would have been unjustifiable. In a brief message to No.3 Group sent at 0200 hrs. the cancellation was reported and concluded, "Reasons to follow in letter."[3]

In the letter which Field sent to Barratt the next day describing the events of the previous night4 he concludes with a report that he clearly did not believe. Field received further messages after the cancellation of the operation from General Houdemon, on the authority of General Vuillemin, that the operation had been cancelled by Churchill. This attempt by the French to make an excuse for the fiasco at Salon was absurd, as Churchill had been one of the major supporters of hitting Italy hard the moment she entered the war.

The incident at Salon clearly reflected the feelings of the two Allies towards the continued prosecution of the war. The French, who were already at this stage considering an Armistice, did not want to provoke the Italians into attacking Southern France. The morale of the French High Command was so low that they could not see any advantage in even attempting to strike at Italy. The twelve aircraft of 'Haddock' could hardly have brought devastation to Northern Italy, but would have demonstrated to the Italian leadership the reality of declaring war.

Mussolini had not dared to order an immediate land attack on France and it was not until 17th June that an attack was ordered. A general attack was launched on 20th June and by this time the ground forces of 'Haddock' were at sea nearing Gibralter.

The incident did cause a strain to relations between the French and the British but not as great as that caused by the sinking of the French Fleet at Oran in July 1940. Both these events although very different demonstrate how far apart the French and the British were in there attitude towards the continuance of the war. At this desperate stage in the Battle of France the British were still determined to strike at a threat to France, without French support.

Notes

1          AIR 27 385 June 1940

2          AIR 35 323 9A

3          AIR 35 157 36A

4          AIR 35 323 9A Copies were also sent to AOC in C Bomber Command and AOC No.3 Group.

RAF Haddock Force June 1940 Part 4

Chapter 2 - RAF Haddock Force

One of the negative points about the airfields in the Marseilles area was that it was felt that they vulnerable to aerial attack from the direction of the sea. 'Haddock' therefore had to be given adequate anti-aircraft protection or the bombers from England might become easy targets.

The problem was that with the worsening situation in Northern France there were no spare anti-aircraft batteries available. Anti- aircraft cover had been requested from BAFF in early June, but there were no units to spare and the only option left was to ask the French to assist. They also had no units available in the area[.1] This lack of cover put the operation in jeopardy as the Air Ministry reminded BAFF on 4th June.[2] On 6th June the question base port defence of Nantes was raised and it was found that the 53rd HAA Regiment could be spared. The Regiment was to be sent to defend Salon and Le Vallon without delay.

The 53rd Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment was a territorial regiment which had been sent to France in early October 1939 as part of the 12th Anti-Aircraft Brigade. The formation of this unit had been ordered by the War Office on 9th October 19393 and it was given the task of defending the airfields of the AASF around Rheims.

When the German advance reached the Rheims area during the early hours of 16th May 1940 the prearranged signal for the withdrawal of the Regiment was received. As the Emergency Move Orders were in two 'stages', and it was not clear whether these 'stages' were to apply the Commander of 157th Battery rushed to RHQ for clarification from the Commanding Officer. On being told to "get out" as quickly as possible due to the advancing enemy, 157th Battery withdrew. Only the a third of the Battery's guns had been prepared for road transport and therefore only the personnel and instruments were evacuated from the majority of the gunsites. Sixteen of the Regiment's twenty four 3" guns were left behind.[4]

The 17th May found the 157th Battery in the area around Troyes to the South of Rheims. The 17th and 18th May were spent salvaging the guns and the storesleft behind in the haste to evacuate the gunsites. All the Battery's guns were recovered together with most of the stores and ammunition, but the salvage operation had to be stopped on the 19th following the capture of 2 Officers (including the Chaplain) and 5 men on a salvage mission.[5]

Brigadier W Crewsdon the Commanding Officer of the 12th AA Brigade felt that the 53rd had "exceeded the evacuation order".[6] The excesses included smashing the guns which left only four of the 53rd's guns fit for repair in the field; eighteen guns had been recovered in total. It was decided that "the 53rd HAA Regiment must therefore suffer for the good of the whole AASF".[7] Of the three Batteries that made up the 53rd, the 158th Battery together with eight officers and 173 men from 157th and 159th Batteries were to remain with the 12th AA Brigade. With the men also went the best part of the Regiment's instruments and transport. What was left of the 53rd was ordered to proceed to Nantes with the fourteen guns that were out of action. There they were to join the defence of the port and get the guns repaired. The 53rd remained part of the 12th AA Brigade, but never rejoined it in France.

What remained of the 53rd Regiment left the Troyes area on 22nd May delayed due to loading difficulties. Loading was difficult with each gun having to be manhandled on to a truck which was ten inches above the siding platform. Two of the guns broke through the trucks and had to be hauled back and reloaded elsewhere. Luck continued to go against the 53rd when one gun fell through its truck while the train was moving. In the early hours of 23rd May the 53rd arrived in Nantes with fourteen damaged guns to assist with the defence of the port.

The train was unloaded immediately it arrived so as to expedite the repair of the guns which together with the gunnery instruments were delivered to the ordnance repair unit for repair and overhaul. The men put under canvas and by the end of May, 157th Battery had three guns back in action. These were immediately deployed to provide anti-aircraft cover for Nantes; by 5th June six guns were back in action.

Lieutenant Colonel V R Krohn RA, Officer Commanding  the 53rd HAA Regiment was telephoned on 6th June by BAFF to confirm the details of the strength of his Regiment. Krohn said he could man 6 gun positions with 13 guns but that as the Regiment was the only defence at Nantes he couldn't be spared. He also said that due to the lack of motor transport the Regiment would need a train. The need for anti-aircraft cover for 'Haddock' was so great and the 53rd was the only available unit, that transport problems could easily be overcome. Following this call, the Brigade Major of the 12th AA Brigade was contacted at 1933 hrs., and he confirmed that Krohn was suitable for the job9.Later the same evening in Nantes, Krohn issued an order that the Regiment was to be ready to move within 48 hours of 0900 hrs. on 7th June.

This was the situation on 7th June when BAFF was able to confirm to the Air Ministry that anti-aircraft cover would be available for 'Haddock' in the form of thirteen 3" guns (one gun was to remain in Nantes and was to follow when repairs had been completed) and four Bofors guns.

The 3" gun with which the 53rd was equipped was obsolete by the outbreak of war as it could not hit aircraft flying at 20,000 feet or more.[8] The planners of 'Haddock' must have hoped that any Italian attack on Salon would be at low level so as to give the gunners a chance.

The entraining, ordered late on  6th June, was completed later than scheduled on the 9th, but despite 46 hours on the train the 53rd Regiment was, as planned, ready for action at first light on 12th June.[10]

Notes

1          AIR 35 157 15A

2          AIR 35 157 16A

3          WO 167 443 Appendix to Bde. Diary

4          WO 167 637 August '39 to June '40

5          WO 167 443 October '39 to June '40

6          WO 167 443 October '39 to June '40

7          WO 167 617 September '39 to June '40

8          AIR 35 81  Re-equipment with 3.7" guns had been hoped for but this as    prevented by the German invasion

9          AIR 35 157 19A

10        AIR 35 157 22A

RAF Haddock Force June 1940 Part 3

Chapter 1 

Final Part with references from National Archive

While these preparations were going on Wing Commander Field was kept busy meeting the local French commanders to ensure the smooth running of the operation. Amongst the commanders he met on 9th June was a Captain of the French Naval Air Arm with whom flying restrictions and identification was discussed as these differed from those of the French Air Force.

The bombers for the force were to be Wellingtons [13] of No.3 Group Bomber Command and the operational instructions of AOC No.3 Group were delivered by Group Captain Harrison on 8th June; he returned to England on 9th June. The bomber operations were under the control of the AOC in C Bomber Command at his HQ in High Wycombe [14] through AOC No.3 Group. The bomber squadrons were still to be based in England and were only using the airfields around Marseilles as advanced landing grounds. Wing Commander Field who was Officer Commanding 'Haddock' was therefore under the administrative control of BAFF HQ and operational control of AOC in C Bomber Command.[15]

On 9th June, just 5 days after Wing Commander Field had first arrived at Salon, he was able to report to 'Eagle' (BAFF HQ) that 'Haddock' would be ready to operate on 10th June. The 10th saw the installation of an R.F.D/F Station and further last minute preparations before the arrival of the bombers. Also a very important cypher arrived from the Air Ministry [16] during the day, stating that Britain would be at war with Italy from 0001 hrs. 11th June. The first attack was scheduled for the night of 11-12th June.

The operation was to be carried out by twelve aircraft from two squadrons within No.3 Group. The plan was that the aircraft would fly down to Salon during the afternoon and carry out an attack the same evening. The next day the aircraft would be readied for an attack that night, and after returning from the raid, they would be refuelled and flown back to England probably passing the 12 aircraft heading for Salon, on the way to replace them. The stay in France was therefore three days in which time two attacks could be carried out; this method of operation required the minimum number of ground parties to be flown in from England. With the Germans occupying much of Northern France, the aircraft were routed away from trouble. They flew from their airfields in Suffolk to Poole followed by St Cast, Nantes, Bordeaux, Castres, Arles and on to Salon or Le Vallon. The list prepared showing the squadrons supplying aircraft rather optimistically goes down to 26th June 1940. [17]

All was set at Salon for the arrival of bombers, which in keeping with the fishy theme, were referred to as baskets of fish.[18] The Wellington bombers were expected to arrive at 1500 hrs. on 11th June and a message from 'Haddock' confirmed that all twelve aircraft had arrived safely between 1530 hrs. and 1615 hrs.[19]

Notes

1          AIR 35 158 1A

2          AIR 35 158 20A

3          AIR 35 74  1A

4          AIR 35 158 18A

5          AIR 35 74  3A

6          AIR 35 74  7A

7          AIR 35 157 1A

8          AIR 35 157 7A

9          AIR 35 157 5A

10        AIR 35 157 8A

11        AIR 25 51/58 (Appendix) B.150

12        AIR 26 97 Diary for May 1940

13        AIR 35 157 10A

14        AIR 35 157 No number on document but dated 7/6/40.

15        AIR 25 51/58 (Appendix) B.148

16        AIR 35 157 31A

17        AIR 25 51/58 (Appendix) B.148

18        AIR 35 323 4A          "Told Haddock that the first basket of fish is being dispatched. They are prepared to receive them at any time." This is written in pencil at the bottom of 4A and is apparently a message to BAFF from Bomber Command.

19        AIR 35 157 35A

Chapter 2 to follow

RAF Haddock Force June 1940 Part 2

Chapter 1 Part 2

In a letter also of 9th May addressed to Vuillemin, Barratt proposed a compromise to the the French Air Forces' lack of co-operation in supplying the ground support required for an operation that had been planned as a joint venture. The Air Marshall proposed that the French supply servicing and transport companies which would be used only until replacements arrived from England. This would prevent any delay in the operation. Replying to this letter on 16th May, Vuillemin agreed and placed at the RAF's disposal the three aerodromes and also agreed to supply the service and transport units required on the proviso that they were returned to the French for service elsewhere as soon as RAF replacements arrived.

Following the invasion of France and the Low Countries by Germany on 10th May 1940 plans for attacking Italy were shelved. Italy still remained out of the war during May but with Hitler's incredible successes, of which Mussolini was kept informed by Hitler himself, the temptation to join Germany and profit from the spoils of war became too great. On the 30th May Mussolini wrote to Hitler informing him that Italy would declare war on the Allies on 5th June. This was inconvenient to Hitler who asked for a postponement of 3 days for the Luftwaffe to deliver the knock out blow to the French Air Force. Mussolini could only agee and postponed his declaration of war to the 10th June.

During this period the French Government was aware of the stiffening of the Italian attitude and attempted to buy off the Italians with proposals involving her territories in North Africa. Mussolini though was eager to gain military prestige and glory and nothing was going to stop him from going to war.

           

Therefore as the British Expeditionary Force was being evacuated from Dunkirk the deterioration of relations between the Allies and Italy caused the plans for a joint aerial attack on Italy to be reinstated.

In a letter[7] from Air Commodore J C Slessor, the Director of Plans to Air Marshal Sir Charles F A Portal AOC in C Bomber Command an update was given of the situation regarding plans for the attack. BAFF had been informed that the French Air Force would now be unlikely to be able to assist in an attack on Italy, because of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Northern France and the reinforcement of the belief by the French that any attack on Italy should be purely retaliatory.

The earlier hopes of breaking Italian morale were now abandoned as distances involved were too great for the RAF alone to keep up the effort that would be required. It was still felt though, that if a sharp surprise blow could be achieved on the declaration of war an important physcological advantage could be gained. Although the attack had now become an RAF operation using the French airfields at Salon and Le Vallon, it was stressed that an attack would not go ahead without consent from the French[8]

With the operation beginning to take shape by the end of May, BAFF requested a code name for the bomber force.[9] The Air Ministry replied the next day (1st June) with the uninspired and uninspiring code name of 'Haddock'.[10]

The airfields to be used were Salon and Le Vallon near Marseilles, which had been put at the disposal of the RAF in May 1940. The airfield at Salon was situated about two miles south of the town of Salon. It consisted of two long narrow airfields separated by the main Avignon - Marseilles road. The western half was designated for use by 'Haddock' and the French Air Force was still using the eastern half, but movement of aircraft between the two halves was possible. The surface of the airfield was grass. Eight and a half miles to the west of Salon town was Le Vallon airfield. This had a flat, clear approach to a grass surface but dust was not a problem as the low scrub kept it down. Vehicular access was good with the airfield just to the south of the Salon - Arles road.[11]

The man who was to be in charge of the operational and refuelling bases for 'Haddock' at the two airfields was Group Captain R M Field of No.71 Wing Headquarters, which had been in Nantes since 22nd May.[12] Field received verbal instructions for the formation of the ground support for 'Haddock' on the morning of 3rd June from SASO (Senior Air Staff Officer) BAFF Air Vice Marshall Evill. Warning of its iminent formation had already been given to the units concerned based at No.2 Base Area, Nantes, on 2nd June. The Administative Instruction was ready to be issued by 1730 hrs on 3rd June. It was issued to No.71 Wing HQ and Nos. 16 and 17 Servicing Flights (having recently arrived from Cherbourg) after Field had flown to Nantes from Orleans. These units moved off between 0400 hrs and 0600 hrs on 4th June by both road and rail.

While the operation for the attack against Italy was being prepared a high level meeting was taking place at the French Admiralty in Paris. Amongst those present on 3rd June were Admiral Darlan and Air Marshall Barratt and several proposals were put forward regarding attacks on Italy should war be declared. The first of these proposals was 'Haddock' which was just getting under way. The French said that fighter support could be given in the Marseilles area if the RAF relieved French fighter by sending further squadrons to Northern France. The French felt that British fighters would help to stop the Germans, but Churchill felt they would be needed to defend Britain later. The third option was a joint attack by the French Navy and Air Force on coastal targets between Genoa and Leghorn; a dawn strike on 14th June took the Italians by surprise and proved to be more successful than 'Haddock'. Finally it was proposed the Fleet Air Arm aircraft that were based at Hyeres were to be at the disposal of the French for mine laying operations. 

Field was flown to Marseilles where he was introduced to the Officer Commanding the British Military Sub Area, Brigadier Dawes. Following this meeting Field was driven with his RAF Liason Officer to the airfield at Salon (this had been given the code name 'Herring'). Here they received a warm welcome from General de Division Houderon, who was in charge of the 'Zones des Operations Aeriennes des Alpes'. This was perhaps the high point of relations between the RAF and the French Air Force at Salon, helped by the fact that Houderon and Field were old friends; this good start though, did not help prevent the misunderstandings and the breakdown in relations later.

The next day, 5th June, was spent organising the billets and a Headquarters for the operation. This was located at Chateau de Richards 3km to the north of Salon. Field was helped in this task by having his own car and driver, which had arrived the previous afternoon after a 430 mile drive from BAFF HQ. The journey from Nantes was considerably longer at 700 miles and so it was not until the evening of the 6th June that the fast convoy of No.71 Wing HQ arrived together with No.17 Servicing Flight and No.1 Heavy Mobile W/T Unit. The latter was perhaps the most important as it gave 'Haddock' direct contact with the Air Ministry in London.

The need for intelligence about Italy's readiness for war was solved with the return of Field from Orleans, where he had made a progress report on 7th June. He brought with him Squadron Leader R B Donovan to collect the relevant material.

By this time Salon was beginning to fill with RAF units and supplies. On 7th June a Meteorological Section arrived together with the rail parties of both Nos.16 and 17 Servicing Flights and a road convoy of No.16 Servicing Flight. Over 8th and 9th June 391 tons of fuel was unloaded by the RAF from a petrol train at the rail head, and distributed between the airfields at Salon and Le Vallon. An ammunition train also arrived on 8th June and took the French until noon on the 10th June to unload. This consisted of 343 tons of ammunition.

RAF Haddock Force June 1940 Part 1

This is part one of an article I have written on the RAF's Haddock Force.  It is based on research I carried out at the National Archive.  I will publish each part over the next week to coincide with the 75th anniversary of Haddock Force.

Haddock Force - France, June 1940

Chapter 1

"On this tenth day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger struck it into the back of his neighbour." In this way Roosevelt described Mussolini's declaration of war on an already war torn France.

The declaration of war by Italy had been anticipated by Britain and France since the outbreak of war in September 1939, when Mussolini, despite the aggressively worded Pact of Steel, wrote and informed Hitler that,

"if Poland and the latters allies open a counterattack against Germany, I inform you in advance that it will be opportune for me not to take the initiative in military operations in view of the present state of Italian war preparations, of which we have repeatedly and in good time informed you"

Opinion was divided over support for Germany amongst the Fascist leadership. Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister and son-in-law of Mussolini, records in his diary for the period, his growing feelings that the Germans had taken advantage of Italy and would not hesitate to do so again. Mussolini was torn between upholding Italian honour by fulfilling his obligations to Germany as set out in the Pact of Steel and the knowledge that the Italian Army and Air Force were under strength for a war of any length.

During the period from September 1939 to June 1940 Italy was in a state of "neutrality", or more accurately a state of non-belligerent support for the Germans. Relations with the Allies, that at times had been cordial, became strained during early 1940 and deteriorated rapidly after the German invasion of France and the Low Countries on 10th May 1940.

The pro-German stance of the Italian Leadership was taken into account by the Allied High Command and military plans were prepared for use in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. At the Ninth meeting of the Supreme War Council resolution 2(2) was passed in which both the French and British governments agreed to consider the question of an air attack on North Western Italy in the event of the Allies declaring war on Italy. As a preliminary step it was agreed that the Air Staffs of both countries should reconoitre aerodromes for this purpose and draw up a plan, so that an attack could take place immediately. M. Reynaud, the French premier,  was worried by the consequences of such an attack which he hoped would not take place until the anti-aircraft defences of the French industrial areas were complete.

Despite Reynaud's reservations, a message was received at the Headquarters of the British Air Forces in France (BAFF) on 26th April 1940 from the Air Ministry in London, part of which read,

"In the event of a serious deteriation of the situation vis a vis Italy it would be desirable to have ready in advance an administrative plan to enable us to operate British Bombers against objectives in Northwest Italy should circumstances permit"[1]

Général Joseph Vuillemin the Commander of the Armée de l'Air immediately offered the RAF the use of several aerodromes located in the area around Marseilles, but these were rejected on two counts; firstly as being too open and thus prone to surprise attack by the Italian Air Force coming from the sea, and secondly the lacking in suitable accommodation for the personnel.[2] After some discussion BAFF were permitted to reconoitre and report back on the suitability of the aerodromes in the Lyons area.

Wing Commander D. MacFadyen was sent by the BAFF together with Capitaine Vieugeot of the Armée de l'Air, who acted as his guide.The object of the reconnaisance was to was sent by BAFF to report on the suitability of the aerodromes in the Lyon area for heavy bomber operations. After having visited six aerodromes that the French were willing to put at the disposal of the RAF, MacFadyen submitted a written report on 30th April2 in which he concluded only three of the aerodromes could be considered for bomber operations, and one of the three was not suitable for night operations. On the 2nd and 3rd May MacFadyen visited a further five aerodromes this time in the Avignon district, but again none of these was suitable.

At the end of his report on the Avignon reconnaissance dated 6th May[3], MacFadyen noted the opinion of his new guide, a Commandant Dezarrois, on the facilities at the aerodrome at Salon, near Marseilles. These included 2 hangers, bulk petrol installations, accommodation for 600 men and the proximity of 11 relief landing grounds including Vallon and Marderve. These were presumably the aerodromes previously offered to the RAF by Général Vuillemin, and are  recommended by MacFadyen due to the lack of suitable aerodromes in the Lyon and Avignon areas, despite their previous rejection.

The geography of the areas checked also had a bearing on the choice by the RAF. An area that was free of mountains and within easy striking distance of the industrial area of Northwest Italy were important  factors and ones which were not found around Lyon and Avignon. The 'Crau' district around Marseilles was ideal, being flat and only about 150 miles from the Italian border.

Whilst these reconnaisances were being undertaken the administrative side of the attack was being planned at BAFF Headquarters. BAFF was to be in charge of the administrative arrangements and thus was responsible for the supply of petrol, bombs, servicing personnel and suitable accommodation for what was hoped to be an intensive campaign, which would produce a knock out blow to the Italian war industry.

In a paper entitled "Note on an Air Offensive against Italy"[4] prepared in early May it is suggested that the attacks from Southern France could completely destroy Italian industry, in particular the aircraft industry; the Caproni works were based at Milan and the Fiat works at Turin produced aero engines. It is stated in the paper that the clear summer nights would favour the attacker, which is ironic as the weather at the time of the actual attack proved to be more prohibitive to its successful prosecution than the enemy.

Air Marshall Sir Arthur Barratt AOC in C BAFF met Général Vuillemin to discuss the availability to the RAF of the aerodromes at Salon, Vallon and Marderve and in a letter to the Air Ministry4 following Vuillemin's agreement in principal to the RAF using the three aerodromes, he set out his thoughts on the operation.

Barratt was concerned by the fact that the French had gone back on a promise made on 5th May to supply Air Companies to service the RAF bombers. This would mean having to supply service sections from the Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF), which was difficult as the heavy bomber servicing flights which were in France with the AASF were leaving shortly for England. This would cause a problem if, as was envisaged, heavy bomber squadrons were to be used to attack Italy. The French, it was hoped, would reconsider and release the promised Air Companies. Barratt's remaining difficulty with Salon was the transport problem caused by the distance between the rail-head and the aerodrome.

During the discussions, Vuillemin had made it clear to Barratt that he would not try to persuade the French government to make the opening attack on Italy, as he considered that any attack should be purely retaliatory. As early as 3rd May the Air Ministry had asked BAFF to make an official approach to the French Government to get the French Air Force to undertake responsibility for operations against Italy, but this attempt had obviously failed. This indication that French support for an immediate air strike against Italy was not complete was perhaps the first sign of trouble, which culminated in the farcical events of the night of 11th/12th June.

6 June 1940 53rd HAA Regiment Diary

On 4 June 1940, the Regimental diary of 53rd HAA Regent recorded the completion of Operation Dynamo, the evacuation from Dunkirk. The Regiment, however, remained in France.

On 6 June 1940 (4 years away from D Day) the 53rd remained part of 12th AA Brigade and the Regiment remained "on loan" for the defenseman of Nantes.

The 157th HAA Battery had 6 guns ready for action but there was no air activity. The Battery continued with field works.

Letter Home 2 June 1940

This letter, written on 2 June 1940 made it out of France and back to England.  It is impressive how the Army Post Office kept function as the Battle of France became more desperate.