RAF Haddock Force June 1940 Part 5 (the final part)

This the final part of my article on RAF Haddock Force.  I hope that you have enjoyed finding out about this little known episode of the Battle of France and thank you for taking the time to read it.

Chapter 3

The twelve Wellingtons which arrived at Salon during the afternoon of 11th June were from Nos. 37 and 75 Squadrons; each Squadron provided six aircraft. They had left their base at Feltwell in Norfolk at 0915 hrs. and were under the command of Wing Commander Merton. The maintenance personnel were taken to Honnington, Norfolk, from where they were flown to Salon.[1]

The Wellingtons were bombed-up and refuelled in readiness for the opening blow in the war against Italy. As the RAF ground personnel went about their duties Wing Commander Field received a visitor who was to start what eventually turned into a night of chaos caused by conflicting orders.

The visitor, a Captain from the staff of General Gama, who commanded the 11e Groupment de Bombardment, told Field that the planned operations were not to be carried by either French or English aircraft. But at 1925 hrs. a cypher was received at Salon which contained the orders for the attack to go ahead. Field wrote the next day that,

"Subsequently, I personnally received a large number of telephone messages from various French authorities, as a result of which I telephoned to Headquarters, BAFF, and in due course received two messages, including one from yourself (Air Marshall Barratt), that no cancellation of these orders was intended."[2]

At 2145 hrs. Air Marshall Barratt received an urgent request from General Vuillemin to stop the attack on Italy. Barratt immediately rang the Air Ministry but he was informed that Churchill and General Ismay were in France at General Weygand's headquarters near Orléans. In his memoirs Churchill recalls that dinner was just being served when Ismay was called to the telephone to speak to Barratt. Churchill, Eden, Dill, Weygand and Reynaud left the table to discuss the situation and Reynaud agreed that the attack should go ahead, and the French authorities were not to interfere any further. One factor in favour of allowing the Wellingtons to proceed was that the Whitleys, also attacking Northern Italy the same night, were too far out to be recalled. The planned combined attack would increase the force of the first aerial attack on Italy.

In the meantime Field had been receiving calls from all quarters of the French Government and Armed Forces. One message came from the Headquarters of the 3rd French Army stating, "the cancellation of the contemplated operation for this evening, as transmitted by the Chief of Staff of General Houdemon, was confirmed". Then a member of the staff of the Vice-Admiral Prefet Maratime of Toulon telephoned. The Captain informed Field that the French Government had formerly forbidden an attack to take place.

The messages continued and Field was even requested to telephone General Vuillemin to hear directly that the operation had been cancelled. At 2300 hrs. Barratt spoke to Ismay again who confirmed that with the Whitleys on the way, Britain was committed to the continuation of the operation. Field had been replying to the French calls and orders that he could only accept orders from superior officers under whom he was placed and who had ordered him to proceed. A further confirmation came, when Barratt telephoned Field and ordered that the operation was to proceed.

It was by this time, after midnight, and the Wellingtons had been ready to depart for almost five hours. If they had to wait any longer the operation would have had to have been cancelled because of the danger of the Wellingtons returning after dawn.

At about 0027 Field received a telephone call from Salon informing him that the Wellingtons were unable to take-off. This was because as the aircraft taxied into position to take-off a number of French military lorries were driven onto the runway and parked so as to prevent the operation taking place. The French drivers were under the orders of Commandant Treff, the commanding officer of the remaining French forces on the other side of the airfield at Salon. Field immediately cancelled the operation for the night as he felt that such action could only be countered by force which would have been unjustifiable. In a brief message to No.3 Group sent at 0200 hrs. the cancellation was reported and concluded, "Reasons to follow in letter."[3]

In the letter which Field sent to Barratt the next day describing the events of the previous night4 he concludes with a report that he clearly did not believe. Field received further messages after the cancellation of the operation from General Houdemon, on the authority of General Vuillemin, that the operation had been cancelled by Churchill. This attempt by the French to make an excuse for the fiasco at Salon was absurd, as Churchill had been one of the major supporters of hitting Italy hard the moment she entered the war.

The incident at Salon clearly reflected the feelings of the two Allies towards the continued prosecution of the war. The French, who were already at this stage considering an Armistice, did not want to provoke the Italians into attacking Southern France. The morale of the French High Command was so low that they could not see any advantage in even attempting to strike at Italy. The twelve aircraft of 'Haddock' could hardly have brought devastation to Northern Italy, but would have demonstrated to the Italian leadership the reality of declaring war.

Mussolini had not dared to order an immediate land attack on France and it was not until 17th June that an attack was ordered. A general attack was launched on 20th June and by this time the ground forces of 'Haddock' were at sea nearing Gibralter.

The incident did cause a strain to relations between the French and the British but not as great as that caused by the sinking of the French Fleet at Oran in July 1940. Both these events although very different demonstrate how far apart the French and the British were in there attitude towards the continuance of the war. At this desperate stage in the Battle of France the British were still determined to strike at a threat to France, without French support.

Notes

1          AIR 27 385 June 1940

2          AIR 35 323 9A

3          AIR 35 157 36A

4          AIR 35 323 9A Copies were also sent to AOC in C Bomber Command and AOC No.3 Group.