RAF Haddock Force June 1940 Part 2

Chapter 1 Part 2

In a letter also of 9th May addressed to Vuillemin, Barratt proposed a compromise to the the French Air Forces' lack of co-operation in supplying the ground support required for an operation that had been planned as a joint venture. The Air Marshall proposed that the French supply servicing and transport companies which would be used only until replacements arrived from England. This would prevent any delay in the operation. Replying to this letter on 16th May, Vuillemin agreed and placed at the RAF's disposal the three aerodromes and also agreed to supply the service and transport units required on the proviso that they were returned to the French for service elsewhere as soon as RAF replacements arrived.

Following the invasion of France and the Low Countries by Germany on 10th May 1940 plans for attacking Italy were shelved. Italy still remained out of the war during May but with Hitler's incredible successes, of which Mussolini was kept informed by Hitler himself, the temptation to join Germany and profit from the spoils of war became too great. On the 30th May Mussolini wrote to Hitler informing him that Italy would declare war on the Allies on 5th June. This was inconvenient to Hitler who asked for a postponement of 3 days for the Luftwaffe to deliver the knock out blow to the French Air Force. Mussolini could only agee and postponed his declaration of war to the 10th June.

During this period the French Government was aware of the stiffening of the Italian attitude and attempted to buy off the Italians with proposals involving her territories in North Africa. Mussolini though was eager to gain military prestige and glory and nothing was going to stop him from going to war.

           

Therefore as the British Expeditionary Force was being evacuated from Dunkirk the deterioration of relations between the Allies and Italy caused the plans for a joint aerial attack on Italy to be reinstated.

In a letter[7] from Air Commodore J C Slessor, the Director of Plans to Air Marshal Sir Charles F A Portal AOC in C Bomber Command an update was given of the situation regarding plans for the attack. BAFF had been informed that the French Air Force would now be unlikely to be able to assist in an attack on Italy, because of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Northern France and the reinforcement of the belief by the French that any attack on Italy should be purely retaliatory.

The earlier hopes of breaking Italian morale were now abandoned as distances involved were too great for the RAF alone to keep up the effort that would be required. It was still felt though, that if a sharp surprise blow could be achieved on the declaration of war an important physcological advantage could be gained. Although the attack had now become an RAF operation using the French airfields at Salon and Le Vallon, it was stressed that an attack would not go ahead without consent from the French[8]

With the operation beginning to take shape by the end of May, BAFF requested a code name for the bomber force.[9] The Air Ministry replied the next day (1st June) with the uninspired and uninspiring code name of 'Haddock'.[10]

The airfields to be used were Salon and Le Vallon near Marseilles, which had been put at the disposal of the RAF in May 1940. The airfield at Salon was situated about two miles south of the town of Salon. It consisted of two long narrow airfields separated by the main Avignon - Marseilles road. The western half was designated for use by 'Haddock' and the French Air Force was still using the eastern half, but movement of aircraft between the two halves was possible. The surface of the airfield was grass. Eight and a half miles to the west of Salon town was Le Vallon airfield. This had a flat, clear approach to a grass surface but dust was not a problem as the low scrub kept it down. Vehicular access was good with the airfield just to the south of the Salon - Arles road.[11]

The man who was to be in charge of the operational and refuelling bases for 'Haddock' at the two airfields was Group Captain R M Field of No.71 Wing Headquarters, which had been in Nantes since 22nd May.[12] Field received verbal instructions for the formation of the ground support for 'Haddock' on the morning of 3rd June from SASO (Senior Air Staff Officer) BAFF Air Vice Marshall Evill. Warning of its iminent formation had already been given to the units concerned based at No.2 Base Area, Nantes, on 2nd June. The Administative Instruction was ready to be issued by 1730 hrs on 3rd June. It was issued to No.71 Wing HQ and Nos. 16 and 17 Servicing Flights (having recently arrived from Cherbourg) after Field had flown to Nantes from Orleans. These units moved off between 0400 hrs and 0600 hrs on 4th June by both road and rail.

While the operation for the attack against Italy was being prepared a high level meeting was taking place at the French Admiralty in Paris. Amongst those present on 3rd June were Admiral Darlan and Air Marshall Barratt and several proposals were put forward regarding attacks on Italy should war be declared. The first of these proposals was 'Haddock' which was just getting under way. The French said that fighter support could be given in the Marseilles area if the RAF relieved French fighter by sending further squadrons to Northern France. The French felt that British fighters would help to stop the Germans, but Churchill felt they would be needed to defend Britain later. The third option was a joint attack by the French Navy and Air Force on coastal targets between Genoa and Leghorn; a dawn strike on 14th June took the Italians by surprise and proved to be more successful than 'Haddock'. Finally it was proposed the Fleet Air Arm aircraft that were based at Hyeres were to be at the disposal of the French for mine laying operations. 

Field was flown to Marseilles where he was introduced to the Officer Commanding the British Military Sub Area, Brigadier Dawes. Following this meeting Field was driven with his RAF Liason Officer to the airfield at Salon (this had been given the code name 'Herring'). Here they received a warm welcome from General de Division Houderon, who was in charge of the 'Zones des Operations Aeriennes des Alpes'. This was perhaps the high point of relations between the RAF and the French Air Force at Salon, helped by the fact that Houderon and Field were old friends; this good start though, did not help prevent the misunderstandings and the breakdown in relations later.

The next day, 5th June, was spent organising the billets and a Headquarters for the operation. This was located at Chateau de Richards 3km to the north of Salon. Field was helped in this task by having his own car and driver, which had arrived the previous afternoon after a 430 mile drive from BAFF HQ. The journey from Nantes was considerably longer at 700 miles and so it was not until the evening of the 6th June that the fast convoy of No.71 Wing HQ arrived together with No.17 Servicing Flight and No.1 Heavy Mobile W/T Unit. The latter was perhaps the most important as it gave 'Haddock' direct contact with the Air Ministry in London.

The need for intelligence about Italy's readiness for war was solved with the return of Field from Orleans, where he had made a progress report on 7th June. He brought with him Squadron Leader R B Donovan to collect the relevant material.

By this time Salon was beginning to fill with RAF units and supplies. On 7th June a Meteorological Section arrived together with the rail parties of both Nos.16 and 17 Servicing Flights and a road convoy of No.16 Servicing Flight. Over 8th and 9th June 391 tons of fuel was unloaded by the RAF from a petrol train at the rail head, and distributed between the airfields at Salon and Le Vallon. An ammunition train also arrived on 8th June and took the French until noon on the 10th June to unload. This consisted of 343 tons of ammunition.