RAF Haddock Force June 1940 Part 1

This is part one of an article I have written on the RAF's Haddock Force.  It is based on research I carried out at the National Archive.  I will publish each part over the next week to coincide with the 75th anniversary of Haddock Force.

Haddock Force - France, June 1940

Chapter 1

"On this tenth day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger struck it into the back of his neighbour." In this way Roosevelt described Mussolini's declaration of war on an already war torn France.

The declaration of war by Italy had been anticipated by Britain and France since the outbreak of war in September 1939, when Mussolini, despite the aggressively worded Pact of Steel, wrote and informed Hitler that,

"if Poland and the latters allies open a counterattack against Germany, I inform you in advance that it will be opportune for me not to take the initiative in military operations in view of the present state of Italian war preparations, of which we have repeatedly and in good time informed you"

Opinion was divided over support for Germany amongst the Fascist leadership. Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister and son-in-law of Mussolini, records in his diary for the period, his growing feelings that the Germans had taken advantage of Italy and would not hesitate to do so again. Mussolini was torn between upholding Italian honour by fulfilling his obligations to Germany as set out in the Pact of Steel and the knowledge that the Italian Army and Air Force were under strength for a war of any length.

During the period from September 1939 to June 1940 Italy was in a state of "neutrality", or more accurately a state of non-belligerent support for the Germans. Relations with the Allies, that at times had been cordial, became strained during early 1940 and deteriorated rapidly after the German invasion of France and the Low Countries on 10th May 1940.

The pro-German stance of the Italian Leadership was taken into account by the Allied High Command and military plans were prepared for use in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. At the Ninth meeting of the Supreme War Council resolution 2(2) was passed in which both the French and British governments agreed to consider the question of an air attack on North Western Italy in the event of the Allies declaring war on Italy. As a preliminary step it was agreed that the Air Staffs of both countries should reconoitre aerodromes for this purpose and draw up a plan, so that an attack could take place immediately. M. Reynaud, the French premier,  was worried by the consequences of such an attack which he hoped would not take place until the anti-aircraft defences of the French industrial areas were complete.

Despite Reynaud's reservations, a message was received at the Headquarters of the British Air Forces in France (BAFF) on 26th April 1940 from the Air Ministry in London, part of which read,

"In the event of a serious deteriation of the situation vis a vis Italy it would be desirable to have ready in advance an administrative plan to enable us to operate British Bombers against objectives in Northwest Italy should circumstances permit"[1]

Général Joseph Vuillemin the Commander of the Armée de l'Air immediately offered the RAF the use of several aerodromes located in the area around Marseilles, but these were rejected on two counts; firstly as being too open and thus prone to surprise attack by the Italian Air Force coming from the sea, and secondly the lacking in suitable accommodation for the personnel.[2] After some discussion BAFF were permitted to reconoitre and report back on the suitability of the aerodromes in the Lyons area.

Wing Commander D. MacFadyen was sent by the BAFF together with Capitaine Vieugeot of the Armée de l'Air, who acted as his guide.The object of the reconnaisance was to was sent by BAFF to report on the suitability of the aerodromes in the Lyon area for heavy bomber operations. After having visited six aerodromes that the French were willing to put at the disposal of the RAF, MacFadyen submitted a written report on 30th April2 in which he concluded only three of the aerodromes could be considered for bomber operations, and one of the three was not suitable for night operations. On the 2nd and 3rd May MacFadyen visited a further five aerodromes this time in the Avignon district, but again none of these was suitable.

At the end of his report on the Avignon reconnaissance dated 6th May[3], MacFadyen noted the opinion of his new guide, a Commandant Dezarrois, on the facilities at the aerodrome at Salon, near Marseilles. These included 2 hangers, bulk petrol installations, accommodation for 600 men and the proximity of 11 relief landing grounds including Vallon and Marderve. These were presumably the aerodromes previously offered to the RAF by Général Vuillemin, and are  recommended by MacFadyen due to the lack of suitable aerodromes in the Lyon and Avignon areas, despite their previous rejection.

The geography of the areas checked also had a bearing on the choice by the RAF. An area that was free of mountains and within easy striking distance of the industrial area of Northwest Italy were important  factors and ones which were not found around Lyon and Avignon. The 'Crau' district around Marseilles was ideal, being flat and only about 150 miles from the Italian border.

Whilst these reconnaisances were being undertaken the administrative side of the attack was being planned at BAFF Headquarters. BAFF was to be in charge of the administrative arrangements and thus was responsible for the supply of petrol, bombs, servicing personnel and suitable accommodation for what was hoped to be an intensive campaign, which would produce a knock out blow to the Italian war industry.

In a paper entitled "Note on an Air Offensive against Italy"[4] prepared in early May it is suggested that the attacks from Southern France could completely destroy Italian industry, in particular the aircraft industry; the Caproni works were based at Milan and the Fiat works at Turin produced aero engines. It is stated in the paper that the clear summer nights would favour the attacker, which is ironic as the weather at the time of the actual attack proved to be more prohibitive to its successful prosecution than the enemy.

Air Marshall Sir Arthur Barratt AOC in C BAFF met Général Vuillemin to discuss the availability to the RAF of the aerodromes at Salon, Vallon and Marderve and in a letter to the Air Ministry4 following Vuillemin's agreement in principal to the RAF using the three aerodromes, he set out his thoughts on the operation.

Barratt was concerned by the fact that the French had gone back on a promise made on 5th May to supply Air Companies to service the RAF bombers. This would mean having to supply service sections from the Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF), which was difficult as the heavy bomber servicing flights which were in France with the AASF were leaving shortly for England. This would cause a problem if, as was envisaged, heavy bomber squadrons were to be used to attack Italy. The French, it was hoped, would reconsider and release the promised Air Companies. Barratt's remaining difficulty with Salon was the transport problem caused by the distance between the rail-head and the aerodrome.

During the discussions, Vuillemin had made it clear to Barratt that he would not try to persuade the French government to make the opening attack on Italy, as he considered that any attack should be purely retaliatory. As early as 3rd May the Air Ministry had asked BAFF to make an official approach to the French Government to get the French Air Force to undertake responsibility for operations against Italy, but this attempt had obviously failed. This indication that French support for an immediate air strike against Italy was not complete was perhaps the first sign of trouble, which culminated in the farcical events of the night of 11th/12th June.